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This thesis aims to evaluate the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of 
dividends in the Vietnamese stock market. The market value of dividends is measured by the 
ex-day drop-off ratio which is the ratio of the stock price drop on the ex-dividend day to the 
amount of dividend. First, the thesis examines how the ex-day drop-off ratio of stocks on the 
Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) changes following the changes in the relative difference 
between the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains. The thesis finds that, on average, the ex-
day drop-off ratios are not responsive to the changes in dividends and capital gains tax rate. 
This finding is inconsistent with the tax hypothesis which predicts the tax differential treatment 
between dividends and capital gains to be the driving force of the ex-day stock price behaviour. 
On the other hand, the thesis documents evidence in support of the short-term trading 
hypothesis. Abnormal trading volume present around the ex-days is adversely affected by 
transaction costs and dividend yields but unaffected by the difference between dividends and 
capital gains tax rate. Secondly, the thesis examines the relationship between the value of 
dividends and state ownership. A positive correlation between the ex-day drop-off ratios and 
state ownership indicates that the market value of dividends is higher in companies with a 
higher level of state ownership. Finally, the thesis finds that the impact on the market value of 
dividends of the tax differential between dividends and capital gains is significant for 
companies with state ownership greater than 50 percent. For companies with state ownership 
less than 50 percent, the difference between dividends and capital gains tax rates does not 








1.1. Motivation and Objectives of the Thesis 
 
There has been a vast amount of research on ex-day price and trading behaviour.1 
Such research offers several important implications. Elton and Gruber (1970) and 
Miller and Scholes (1982) argue that investigating ex-day prices helps to identify 
marginal investors from which to evaluate the relationship between dividend yield 
and stock return. The subsequent ex-dividend studies highlight several factors that 
can affect the ex-day price and volume behaviour. These include the differential tax 
treatment between dividends and capital gains (Elton and Gruber, 1970), 
transaction costs and risks (Kalay, 1982), investors’ tax heterogeneity (Michaely 
and Vila, 1995) or market microstructure elements such as bid-ask bounces and tick 
size (Bali and Hite, 1998; Frank and Jagannathan, 1998). 
The level of drop in stock price on the ex-dividend day has been used widely as an 
indicator of the market value of dividends in the ex-dividend studies. With the 
frictionless absence of transaction costs and taxes, stock price on the ex-dividend 
day is expected to drop by the amount of dividend (Miller and Modigliani, 1961). 
Nonetheless, it is well documented that the ex-day stock price drops by less than 
the dividend amount. For example, a mean drop-off ratio of 0.78 for listed 
                                                          




companies in the US market is reported by Elton and Gruber (1970) who argue that 
the ex-day price drop by less than the amount of dividend is a reflection of the 
penalty for a heavier tax burden on dividends than on capital gains (the tax 
hypothesis). Since then, the tax hypothesis is challenged by the short-term trading 
hypothesis. Kalay (1982) argues that short-term traders who face no tax difference 
between dividends and capital gains would arbitrage away any positive return on 
the ex-day. The implication is that the ex-day price behaviour may not be solely 
determined by the difference in dividends and capital gains tax but also by other 
factors such as transaction costs and risk exposure (Kalay, 1982; Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen, 1986; Karpoff and Walkling, 1988; Boyd and Jagannathan, 1998). 
More recently, market microstructure explanations emerge to incorporate bid-ask 
bounce and price discreteness in explaining the phenomenon of ex-day price drop-
off different from unity (Dubofsky, 1992; Bali and Hite, 1998; Frank and 
Jagannathan, 1998). Despite considerable research efforts, the debate on the ex-day 
price behaviour and varying explanations for different markets are still continuing 
(Al Yahyaee et al., 2008). Moreover, the requirement for further research to better 
understand the impact of taxes on the ex-day price behaviour is still substantial 
(Francis et al., 2012).  
The primary purpose of this research is to examine how the market value of 
dividends in the Vietnamese stock market is affected by the differential tax 
treatment on dividends and on capital gains. Many complexities and ambiguities 
inherent in data used by previous studies on ex-day price behaviour are resolved in 
this research. First, the tax structure in Vietnam is much simpler than that in the US, 
UK or Australia. There is no need to identify the marginal tax rate since a flat tax 
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rate is applied to both dividends and capital gains which contributes to relieving the 
complexity involved in testing the tax hypothesis. Furthermore, examining 
legislative changes which only affect the differential tax treatment between 
dividends and capital gains allows tax-explanations for ex-day behaviour to be more 
reliable. As Lasfer (1995) argues, studying ex-day stock price change that follows 
regulatory changes is advantageous because it can isolate the interaction effect 
among taxes, transaction costs and risks on stock price. There are three key changes 
to tax legislations during the sample period from January 2006 to December 2012 
in Vietnam which result in three distinct sub-periods with varying levels of 
dividends and capital gains tax. Prior to 30 June 2010, there was no tax on either 
dividends or capital gains. The Law on Personal Income Tax 2007 stipulated a 
dividends tax rate of five percent and a capital gains tax rate of 20 percent which 
applied to dividends received and capital gains realised after 1 July 2010. From 1 
August 2011, the tax on dividends was removed and the tax rate on capital gains 
was reduced by half to 10 percent. Consequently, examining the variations in the 
ex-day drop-off ratios in the three sub-periods is expected to provide insights into 
how the dividend value changes in response to a change in the relative difference 
between dividends and capital gains tax rate. 
This study also aims to detect the presence of short-term trading around the ex-days 
in the Vietnamese market since short-term trading has been attributed to negate the 
impact of taxes on the ex-day price behaviour (Kalay, 1982). The presence of 
investors trading around the ex-days for dividend related purposes would lead to 
abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days. The question as to whether investors 
engage in dividend avoidance or dividend capture trading is examined using 
abnormal return analysis around the ex-days. The positive abnormal return is 
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expected to be associated with buying pressure caused by an increase in demand 
while the negative abnormal return is most likely to be the result of selling pressure 
(Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer, 1995). 
Finally, the thesis investigates how ownership structure influences the market value 
of dividends. As an emerging market, ownership structure is a critical issue in 
Vietnam (Phung and Hoang, 2013). The focus of this study is on whether the market 
value of dividend of a company is affected by the level of state ownership. Although 
the number of state-owned enterprises has decreased significantly since the 
beginning of the equitisation process in 1992, Vietnamese companies are still 
characterised by a high level of state ownership (Sjoholm, 2006; Truong, 2007; Vo, 
2013; Phung and Hoang, 2013).                                                
Using the data of dividend-paying firms listed on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange, 
the research attempts to address the following questions: 
1. How is the market value of dividends affected by the differential tax treatment 
between dividends and capital gains? 
2. Does short-term trading play a role in explaining the impact of the differential 
tax treatment between dividends and capital gains on the market value of 
dividends? 
3. How is the market value of dividends affected by the level of state ownership? 
1.2. Contributions 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature by providing insights into the market 
value of dividends and trading patterns around the ex-dividend day in an 
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institutional setting that is distinguished from the previously investigated markets. 
Traditionally, it has been witnessed that dividends tax rate is higher than capital 
gains tax rate (e.g. US, UK, Australia) or is equal to capital gains tax rate (e.g. Hong 
Kong, Oman). The drop-off ratios in these markets are found to be consistently less 
than one which indicates that dividends are discounted by investors relative to 
capital gains. In contrast, the tax rate on dividends in Vietnam has never been higher 
than the tax rate on capital gains. This provides a unique opportunity to test if 
dividends can ever be valued by investors more than its nominal value under the 
classical tax system. Moreover, the study also makes a contribution to the relevant 
literature by examining the relation between ownership structure and the market 
value of dividends. Even after the equitisation process in Vietnam which started in 
1992, the State remains as a controlling shareholder in most equitised firms 
(Truong, 2007; Vo, 2013). This study provides evidence on how the level of state 
ownership as an internal factor affects the market value of dividends.  
This study has several practical implications. First, corporate managers can be 
informed of how their dividends are valued against capital gains in the market under 
a different tax regime; for instance, would dividends be more or less valuable for 
investors when the gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate is 
wider? Results of the current research would also help corporate executives 
understand whether ownership structure affects the value of dividends perceived by 
investors. Collectively, such knowledge helps corporate managers better 
understand how dividend policy affects the firm value which would assist them in 
determining the optimal dividend policy. Moreover, the identification of a short-
term trading pattern and the existence of abnormal return would open ways for 
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investors to create a profitable trading strategy (Graham et al., 2007). For instance, 
if abnormal return is positive before the ex-day, investors might consider buying 
the stock before the level of abnormal return increases and sell afterward. The 
presence of profit opportunities would not necessarily guarantee the realization of 
abnormal returns as transactions around ex-dividend days are not without risk and 
abnormal returns also depend on firm-specific characteristics (Grammatikos, 1989). 
Finally, the analysis of abnormal returns and the level of state ownership would 
allow investors to understand whether abnormal returns are affected by the presence 
of the State as a shareholder. 
1.3. Structure of the Thesis  
 
The thesis is structured as follows. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter reviews theoretical and empirical literature relevant to the ex-dividend 
price and volume behaviour. The previous literature on the relation between 
ownership structure and dividend policy is also reviewed.  
Chapter 3: Institutional Settings of the Vietnamese Market 
This chapter presents the institutional features of the Vietnamese market. It reviews 
the equitisation process in Vietnam to emphasise the importance of incorporating 
state ownership to the study in examining the impact of taxes on the market value 
of dividends. The chapter then discusses the development process of the stock 
market in Vietnam and the mechanism under which stocks are traded. Also included 
in the chapter is the discussion on dividend policies of Vietnamese listed 




Chapter 4: Hypotheses, Data and Methods 
This chapter develops a set of hypotheses to be tested in this thesis based on the 
existing literature and the relevant market conditions in Vietnam. The chapter then 
discusses data and methods used to test the hypotheses. 
Chapter 5: Empirical Findings 
This chapter first presents univariate and regression results on ex-day drop-off 
ratios, abnormal returns and abnormal volumes. The chapter next discusses how the 
results lead to the acceptance or rejection of each hypothesis proposed in Chapter 
4. Finally, based on hypothesis testing results, the chapter concludes about the 
impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of dividends and how state 
ownership acts as a moderating factor in explaining the impact of taxes on the 
market value of dividends. 
Chapter 6: Summary and Conclusions 
This chapter provides a summary of each chapter which includes the discussion of 
the key findings. The chapter then discusses the practical implications of the 
research for board of directors, regulators and investors. Finally, the chapter 













This chapter presents a theoretical framework where the concept of dividend value 
is derived. Section 2.1 discusses different theories about the effects of dividend 
policies on the firm’s value. Followed in section 2.2 to 2.5 are a series of hypotheses 
proposing different explanations to the factors that affect the market value of 
dividends. Each hypothesis is complemented by empirical studies. Included in 
section 2.6 is the literature review on the relation between ownership structure and 
dividend policy which provides indirect evidence on how the market value of 
dividends might be affected by ownership structure of the firm. 
2.1. Dividend Policy and the Firm’s Value 
 
Miller and Modigliani (referred hereinafter as M&M) (1961) published their 
seminal paper to argue that a firm’s dividend policy has no effect on the firm’s 
value. M&M’s basic argument is that a firm’s share price is determined by the 
shareholder’s expectation of the firm’s future prospect which, in turn, depends on 
its earning generating ability and investment decisions. They propose that the way 
a company distributes its earnings through its dividend policy is not relevant to how 
the shareholders perceive the firm’s value. M&M’s proposition is made based on 
certain assumptions about market perfection such as no taxes, no transaction costs, 
no information asymmetry, and no agency costs. Since the theory’s introduction in 
1961, a number of empirical studies have been conducted to test its validity but not 
without problems due to the theory’s complicated assumptions (Ball et al., 1979). 
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Black and Scholes (1974) document the result which supports M&M’s dividend 
irrelevance theory in that they find no difference in the expected return of high-
yield and low-yield stocks. This result suggests that investors do not perceive 
dividend policy to be important in determining a firm’s value. Before the 
introduction of the dividend irrelevance theory, the common belief among market 
participants was also that dividend policy would not affect dividend value; 
therefore, stock prices on the ex-dividend days should drop by approximately the 
amount of dividends (Campbell and Beraneck, 1955). The assumptions made by 
M&M, however, are unrealistic since no market would be able to realise such 
perfections; therefore, it is challenging to prove the reliability of their argument. 
Their conclusion would make sense if shareholders’ expectations depend solely on 
the present value of the firm’s future free cash flows (Ross, 2009) while, in fact, 
shareholders’ expectation also varies with other factors such as new information 
release. 
The bird-in-the-hand hypothesis is different from M&M’s theory in that it suggests 
that dividend policy affects the firm’s value. Graham and Dodd (1951) are among 
the first scholars who make arguments in favour of high dividend payout.2 Under 
the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis, investors prefer dividends which are a certainty to 
fluctuating capital gains. A high level of dividend also reduces agency problems 
since financial managers will have less cash to make unnecessary investments. For 
these reasons, a higher level of dividend is expected to be associated with a higher 
                                                          
2 Graham, B. & Dodd, D. (1951) ‘It is now becoming standard practice to evaluate common stock 
by applying one multiplier to that portion of earnings paid in dividends and a much smaller multiplier 




firm value. This hypothesis was critically challenged by M&M (1961) when they 
argued that the way a firm distributed its earnings did not affect its ability to 
generate future cash flow and the firm value. Al-Malkawi et al. (2010) report that 
up to date, there has been little support, both in terms of theoretical and empirical 
research, for the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis. 
One alternative and opposing view to the bird-in-the-hand hypothesis is the tax 
preference theory. Allowing taxes to exist, the tax preference theory argues that the 
dividends and capital gains tax differential drives investors to demand dividends 
differently. According to the tax preference theory, if dividends are taxed at a higher 
rate than capital gains, then people will prefer stocks that pay low dividends and 
vice versa. Even in cases where dividends and capital gains are taxed equally, 
capital gains are preferred due to their deferral of tax payment until realised. 
Researchers have consistently found evidence to support this view that capital gains 
are preferred to dividends when they observe stock prices on the ex-day decline by 
less than the amount of dividends [see Campbell and Beraneck (1955); Elton and 
Gruber (1970); Kalay (1982)]. The explanations as to why dividend value is 
discounted against capital gains, however, are not confined to the relative difference 
between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. The sections that follow 
discuss various hypotheses that attempt to explain how dividends are valued against 
capital gains. 
2.2. Tax Hypothesis 
 
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the market will set the equilibrium price on the 
ex-day so that a marginal investor is indifferent between selling before or on the ex-
11 
 
day. In this way, the marginal investor is assumed to be a long-term investor. 
Denote the stock price on the cum-day and on the ex-day by Pcum and Pex 
respectively. P0 is the initial purchase price. If the investor sells the stock before it 
goes ex-dividend, he will forgo the dividend to the buyer. In this case, his income 
is in the form of capital gains after taking capital gains tax into account at the capital 
gains tax rate of tg. The resulting income can be expressed as: 
cumP  – ( cumP – 0P  ) gt  
If instead he decides to sell the stock on the ex-day, his income will be sourced from 
both dividends and capital gains. If dividends are taxed at the rate of td, his total 
income after taxes is: 
exP  – ( exP  – 0P ) gt  + D  (1– dt ) 
In equilibrium: 
                     
cumP – ( cumP  – 0P ) gt  = exP – ( exP – 0P ) gt + D  (1– dt ) 
               
cumP – cumP  gt + 0P  gt  = exP  – exP  gt  + P0 gt  + D (1– dt ) 
                                    
cumP  (1– gt ) = exP  (1– gt ) + D  (1– dt  ) 
                      (
cumP – exP )(1– gt ) = D  (1– dt ) 













                                                                  (1) 
The left hand side of equation (1) is called the drop-off ratio or ex-day premium. 
Equation (1) shows that the different-from-dividend ex-day price drop is due to the 
differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains. Equation (1) also 
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indicates that if investors in the low tax bracket hold high-yield stock, its right-hand 
side increases. The left-hand side, therefore, should be high. In other words, if the 
dividend tax clientele exists, there should be a positive relation between dividend 
yield and drop-off ratio. Elton and Gruber also argue that equation (1) can be used 
to infer the marginal shareholder’s tax rate. In fact, Elton and Gruber find that the 
mean drop-off ratio from stocks listed on the NYSE from 1966 to 1970 is 0.78. 
They attribute this smaller-than-one drop-off ratio to the higher dividends tax rate 
than capital gains tax rate in the US market. They also document that drop-off ratio 
and dividend yield are positively correlated.  
Several empirical studies provide evidence in support of the tax hypothesis. Barclay 
(1987) reports the ex-day stock price to fall by the full amount of dividend prior to 
the adoption of income tax in the US. In examining the Swedish lottery bond market 
where cash distributions are tax advantaged compared to capital gains, Green and 
Rydqvist (1999) also report evidence consistent with the tax-based explanation of 
the ex-day price behaviour. They find the mean drop-off ratio of mixed bonds and 
sequenced bonds to be 1.1 and 1.3 respectively. Similar to the argument by Elton 
and Gruber (1970), Green and Rydqvist (1999) conclude that the differential tax 
treatment on dividend income and capital gains drives the bond prices on the ex-
dividend days.  
Milonas et al. (2006) study both non-taxable and taxable shares in the Chinese 
market. For non-taxable shares, they find that the stock price drop on the ex-
dividend day is not statistically different from the amount of dividend. For taxable 
stocks, how much stock price falls on the ex-day is found to be strictly determined 
by the effective tax rate on dividends. At one extreme where dividends and capital 
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gains are equally taxed, stock price on the ex-day is found to decline by the full 
amount of dividend. At the other extreme where dividends are tax-advantaged 
relative to capital gains, the ex-day price drop is significantly higher than the 
dividend amount. The overall results in Milonas et al. (2006) are supportive of the 
tax-based explanation for the ex-day price behaviour. 
Studies testing the tax hypothesis have also examined ex-day price behaviour pre- 
and post-tax legislative changes. As argued by Lasfer (1995), observing ex-day 
price behaviour pre- and post-tax legislative changes helps to separate the impact 
of tax from other confounding effects. Barclay (1987) finds that, prior to 1913 when 
the Income Tax was adopted in the US, the ex-day drop-off ratio was equal to one. 
When the dividends tax rate became higher than the capital gains tax rate in 1913, 
the price drop on the ex-day was significantly less than the dividend amount. This 
US evidence supports the tax-based argument by Elton and Gruber (1970). In a 
similar manner, using data of listed firms on the London Stock Exchange for the 
period from 6 April 1985 to 5 April 1994, Lasfer (1995) provides evidence to 
support the tax hypothesis in the UK. With the introduction of the 1988 UK Income 
and Corporation Taxes Act (ICTA), which significantly reduced the gap between 
dividends and capital gains tax rate, he reports that the post-1988 ex-day drop-off 
ratios were higher than the pre-1988 drop-off ratios.3 Lasfer argues that an increase 
in the post-1988 ex-day drop-off ratios was caused by the availability of tax credits 
attached to dividends resulting from the ICTA.  
                                                          
3 ICTA eliminated all income (including dividend) tax rates above 40 percent and required capital 




Using Elton and Gruber’s proposition and approach, Bell and Jenkinson (2002) 
examine the impact of a tax reform in the UK in 1997 on the valuation of dividend. 
Prior to 1997, the UK operated an imputation tax system in which investors who 
received dividends from profits taxed at the corporate level were issued a tax credit. 
This tax credit could be used to reduce investors’ tax liability. More interestingly, 
tax-exempt investors could claim to receive their unused tax credits in cash. The 
tax reform in 1997 abolished the ability of tax-exempt investors to claim tax credits, 
therefore making dividends and capital gains equally valuable to tax-exempt 
investors. Pension funds were the group that were most affected by this reform since 
they constituted the majority of tax-exempt investors. Bell and Jenkinson (2002) 
find a significant reduction in the value of dividend income after 1997 by pension 
funds as evidenced by a lower drop-off ratio, particularly for high-yielding stocks. 
This evidence supports the hypothesis that tax plays a key role in explaining the ex-
day stock price behaviour in the UK market. 
Lasfer and Zenonos (2003) study the ex-day stock price behaviour in four European 
countries: France, Germany, Italy and the UK. They report that the ex-day returns 
are positive and significant in all four countries, meaning that the ex-day stock price 
falls by less than the amount of dividend. Moreover, Lasfer and Zenonos (2003) 
find evidence showing that changes in the tax regime on dividends and capital gains 
significantly affect the ex-day returns. They conclude that taxation is the sole 
determinant of the ex-day stock price in these four European countries. 
Elton, Gruber and Blake (2005) reconfirm the effect of tax on the ex-day price 
behaviour in the US market by examining two mutual funds for the period 1988-
2001. For non-taxable funds, the ex-day drop-off ratio is greater than one which 
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means that ex-day prices drop by more than the amount of dividends. For taxable 
mutual funds, drop-off ratio is reported to be smaller than one when dividends tax 
rate is higher than capital gains tax rate. When dividends and capital gains are taxed 
at the same rate, ex-day stock prices drop by the full amount of dividend. More 
recently, Francis et al. (2012) compare the drop-off ratios before and after the 
introduction of the imputation tax credit system in Taiwan in 1998. They find that 
the new tax system designed to reduce the burden on dividends tax leads to a higher 
value of dividend with a higher drop-off ratio which is consistent with the argument 
by Elton and Gruber (1970). 
In short, the key argument raised by the tax hypothesis is that the difference between 
the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains is the major concern for investors in 
valuing dividends. However, there are other previous studies that find evidence 
against the tax hypothesis. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) report a drop-off ratio of 
significantly less than one in the Hong Kong market for the period 1980–1993 when 
no tax was imposed on dividends and capital gains. Similar to the case of Hong 
Kong, Oman experienced a drop-off ratio deviating from unity which contradicts 
the prediction of the tax hypothesis (Al Yahyaee et al., 2008). Michaely (1991) 
studies the 1986 Tax Reform Act in the US which removed the differential tax 
treatment between dividends and capital gains but finds no change in the ex-day 
drop-off ratio. Using ex-day excess return as an alternative indicator of the ex-day 
price behaviour, Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) challenge the tax hypothesis when 
they find positive abnormal returns over the ex-dividend period for non-taxable 
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stock dividends and stock splits.4 These results suggest that tax might not be the 
sole determinant of the market value of dividends.  
2.3. Short-term Trading Hypothesis 
 
The tax hypothesis is challenged by researchers who believe that ex-day price 
behaviour is affected by factors other than taxes. Kalay (1982) argues that the tax 
effect is only applicable for long-term traders who face differential tax rate between 
dividends and capital gains. Short-term traders who face no preferential tax 
treatment on either dividends or capital gains would attempt to capture dividends, 
and the ex-day price behaviour is then affected by factors such as transaction costs 
and risk exposure. Assuming that investors are risk-neutral and that their primary 
consideration is transaction cost, Kalay argues that the ex-day drop-off ratio is 
within the following bounce: 





     
in which 2c represents a round-trip cost. Based on this argument, drop-off ratio is 
dependent on the level of transaction costs, which in turn depends on dividend yield. 
More specifically, transaction costs are higher for low-yielding stocks (Graham et 
al., 2003). By this way, short-term trading activity is predicted to be more 
pronounced for high-yield stocks. 
                                                          
4 Eades, Hess and Kim (1984) argue that the use of the ex-day drop-off ratio suffers from 
heteroskedasticity and lack of independence. To avoid these problems, they use the concept of ex-
day abnormal return to measure the ex-day stock price behaviour. Borrowing the tax-based argument 
of Elton and Gruber (1970) in the interpretation of the ex-day abnormal returns, Eades, Hess and 
Kim (1984) argue that when dividends are taxed more heavily than capital gains, investors will 
demand a tax premium on the ex-dividend day, leading the ex-day abnormal returns to be positive. 
For non-taxable samples, the required tax premium of zero, is expected to yield an excess return of 
zero on ex-days. 
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Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) find evidence of short-term trading around the 
ex-day in the US market. By examining stock prices and trading volumes of listed 
firms on the NYSE from 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1981, they find stock 
prices increase significantly before the ex-day and decline sharply afterward. To 
control for confounding effect of ex-day factors such as transaction costs, capital 
gains and dividends tax differential on ex-day transactions, Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1986) focus their study on ex-day trading volume. They find a sharp 
increase in trading volume both before and after the ex-day. They also document a 
negative relationship between trading volume and transaction cost and a positive 
relationship between trading volume and dividend yield. The evidence provided by 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) supports Kalay’s argument that the ex-day price 
behaviour is not solely a consequence of the difference between dividends tax rate 
and capital gains tax rate. Consistent with the finding of Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986), Daunfeldt (2002) reports a positive correlation between abnormal trading 
volumes and dividend yields, suggesting that short-term traders concentrate on 
high-yielding stocks. 
Karpoff and Walkling (1990) confirm the existence of dividend capture on the 
NASDAQ for the period 1973–1985. They find a strong correlation between the 
ex-day return and transaction cost, particularly for high-yielding stocks.5 The 
findings of Karpoff and Walkling further complicate the interpretation of the ex-
day price behaviour. The drop-off ratios then reflect not only the marginal 
shareholder’s tax rate but also the marginal shareholder’s transaction cost.  
                                                          
5  Karpoff and Walkling (1990) use bid-ask spreads as a proxy for transaction costs. 
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Athanassakos (1996) also provides evidence to support the short-term trading effect 
in the Canadian market from 1970 to 1984. He finds that trading volumes increase 
abnormally for a number of days around the ex-day. In particular, the results exhibit 
buying pressure before the ex-day and selling pressure once the stock goes ex-
dividend. For the period when transaction costs are reduced, Athanassakos 
documents a significant increase in trading volume. These findings suggest that 
short-term traders play a certain role in determining the stock price and volume 
behaviour around the ex-day. 
Studies using abnormal returns also show evidence to support the presence of short-
term trading around the ex-day. Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) find positive 
abnormal returns for some days before the ex-day and negative abnormal returns 
once the stocks go ex-dividend. Likewise, Shaw (1991) documents positive 
abnormal returns before the ex-day and negative abnormal returns on and after the 
ex-day for non-taxable master limited partnership distributions. In a study by Eades 
et al. (1994), high-yielding stocks experience a shift in the sign of abnormal returns 
from positive before the ex-day to negative after the ex-day, while low-yielding 
stocks do not exhibit such a pattern. This evidence found in Eades et al. (1994) 
supports the prediction from the short-term trading hypothesis that dividend capture 
activities are most likely to take place in high-yield stocks. 
2.4. Tax Heterogeneity Argument 
 
According to Michaely and Vila (1995), tax heterogeneity among investors results 
from the difference in relative tax rates on dividends and capital gains for different 
groups of investors. They argue that trading around the ex-dividend days reflects 
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the interaction among investors with tax heterogeneity. It follows that investors who 
face a higher tax on dividends than on capital gains will attempt to avoid dividends 
by selling the stocks before the ex-days. On the other hand, investors who are not 
subject to the differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains are 
expected to exercise dividend capture strategy by buying before the ex-days. These 
two categories of investors will then trade with each other around the ex-day. 
Therefore, the ex-day stock price is not solely determined by a single marginal tax 
rate. To examine the effect of investors’ tax heterogeneity on ex-day trading, 
Michaely and Vila (1995) study the 1986 Tax Reform which aligned tax differential 
of investors. They find that trading volume decreases significantly following the 
reduction in tax heterogeneity among investors. Likewise, Michaely and Murgia 
(1995) report a higher abnormal volume for stocks with greater tax heterogeneity 
among investors. When estimating trading volume changes using time-series 
variations, Michaely and Vila (1996) also document a positive correlation between 
abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days and the degree of tax heterogeneity 
among investors. A few studies have provided further support to the arguments of 
Michaely and Vila. Dhaliwal and Li (2006) study how abnormal trading volumes 
around the ex-days are affected by the interaction between dividend yield and 
institutional ownership. The dividend yield is used as an indicator of the degree to 
which return is tax disadvantaged6 and institutional ownership as a proxy for the 
tax heterogeneity among investors.7 They find a positive correlation between 
                                                          
6 Since dividends are taxed at higher rates than capital gains, the higher the dividend yield, the more 
tax disadvantaged the stock return is. 
7 If the level of institutional ownership is very low, then most investors are homogeneous individual 
investors while if the level of institutional ownership is very high, then most investors are 
homogeneous institutional investors. Therefore, in these two extreme cases, the level of investors’ 
tax heterogeneity is very low. Tax heterogeneity among investors will be high if institutional 
ownership is somewhere in between. 
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abnormal trading volumes and dividend yield. Zhang, Farrell and Brown (2008) 
also find that the 2003 Tax Act in the US which removed the tax heterogeneity 
among individual investors led to a decrease in abnormal trading volumes of high-
yield stocks around the ex-days. The tax heterogeneity argument highlights that 
investors trade around the ex-days for different tax-related purposes and that as 
investors’ motivation to trade decreases, the level of trading would also be reduced 
as a result. 
2.5. Market Microstructure Explanations 
 
Most recent market microstructure explanations for the ex-day price behaviour 
focus on price discreteness, bid-ask bounce and limit order adjustments. Dubofsky 
(1992) argues that drop-off ratios deviating from unity are caused by NYSE Rule 
118, AMEX Rule 132 and price discreteness. According to these rules, on the ex-
day, open limit buy orders are lowered by the amount of cash dividend. Under the 
mechanism of tick size and price discreteness, if the adjusted price is not a multiple 
of the tick, it will be lowered to the next tick. Due to that, the level of the ex-day 
stock price drop cannot be exactly equal to the level of dividend. Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998) propose an alternative market microstructure-based 
explanation for the ex-day price behaviour. In the Hong Kong stock market where 
there is no tax on either dividends or capital gains, the drop-off ratio is reported to 
be significantly less than one which is against the prediction of the tax hypothesis. 
Frank and Jagannathan (1998) attribute this phenomenon to bid-ask bounce based 
on the fact that market makers buy the stocks on the last cum-day at the bid price 
and sell on the ex-day at the ask price. The ex-day drop-off ratio is therefore 
sensitive to bid-ask spread. Graham et al. (2003) and Al Yahyaee et al. (2008) argue 
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that the ex-day drop-off ratio should be closer to one when mid-point of bid and ask 
prices are used instead of closing prices for calculation. In fact, Al Yahyaee et al. 
(2008) find that the drop-off ratio calculated from closing prices is significantly less 
than one in Oman where no tax is imposed on dividends and capital gains. However, 
when midpoint pricing is used, the ex-day stock price is proved to drop by the full 
amount of dividends. This is consistent with the argument by Frank and 
Jagannathan (1998) that bid-ask bounce plays a role in affecting the ex-day price 
behaviour. 
Bali and Hite (1998) argue that the drop-off ratio is smaller than one due to the fact 
that price change is discrete based on tick size while dividend is continuous. Their 
argument is that since investors are never willing to pay for more than the value of 
the dividend, the level of price drop will be rounded to the next smaller tick. For 
example, if the tick size is $1/10 and the dividend amount is $0.15, the stock price 
will only drop by $0.1. The implication is that when tick size becomes larger, the 
drop-off ratio will deviate more from one. However, inconsistent with Bali and Hite 
(1998), Graham et al. (2003) find no change in the drop-off ratio when price 
quotation changed from 1/8th to 1/16th. In contrast, Al-Yahyaee (2013) supports 
Bali and Hite’s argument. He finds that in Oman, the ex-day drop-off ratio increases 
as a result of a smaller tick size. 
2.6. Ownership Structure and Dividend Value 
 
In addition to the tax hypothesis, the short-term trading hypothesis, the tax 
heterogeneity argument and the market microstructure explanations discussed 
above, there are other causes which received attention in an attempt to explain the 
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determination of dividend value. M&M (1961) argue that dividend clienteles are 
formed by investors’ ages and that the dividend value of low-yield stocks is higher 
for young investors. Frank and Jagannathan (1998) attribute the nuisance of 
handling with dividends as what makes dividends less valuable for investors. There 
are also behavioural studies that attempt to explain dividend value. Thaler and 
Shefrin (1981), for example, propose that self-control drives investors to prefer cash 
dividends rather than income from capital gains.  
In literature, the evidence on how dividend value is correlated with ownership 
structure is not clear while the relation between ownership structure and dividend 
policy is more solidly established. The aim of studies on ownership structure and 
dividend policy is to establish a relation between a group of investors with certain 
roles and the level of dividend paid. For instance, some studies document the 
relation between institutional holding and dividend policy. Institutional investors, 
due to their active monitoring roles, can improve a firm’s value and firms increase 
dividends to attract institutions (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). As a result, a positive 
correlation between institutional holding and dividends is predicted. On the other 
hand, managerial owners have the incentives to increase their own wealth rather 
than the wealth of outside shareholders and, therefore, might attempt to cut dividend 
(Demsetz, 1985). Jensen et al. (1992) support the argument by Demsetz (1985) 
when they find that a higher insider ownership is associated with a lower dividend 
payout among the US firms. Similarly, Short et al. (2002) document a negative 
association between dividend payout and managerial ownership. These results 
suggest that dividend policies can be affected by the ownership characteristics. 
More recently, some studies attempt to shed light on the relation between ownership 
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structure and dividend policy in markets where the State holds a large proportion 
of corporate shares. Al-Malkawi (2007) finds that the amount of dividend paid is 
largely affected by the presence of the government or its agencies as the largest 
shareholders. Wei et al. (2003) report that Chinese firms with higher state 
ownership pay higher cash dividends. The case of Vietnam is similar to China in 
that shares held by the State are not openly traded in the stock market. In that way, 
the main source of stock income for the State is from dividends. Studies in literature, 
however, hardly attempt to relate the role of the State in influencing dividend policy 
to the perception of investors toward the value of dividends. This issue is explored 
in the current study. 
2.7. Summary and Conclusions 
 
This chapter provides a theoretical framework which encompasses the concept of 
dividend value relative to capital gains. The chapter also discusses a body of 
literature which examines various factors able to affect the ex-day stock price 
behaviour. It is a common belief among market participants that the ex-day stock 
price should fall by the exact amount of dividends, making dividend value 
unaffected by external factors such as taxes or transaction costs (Campbell and 
Beraneck, 1955). However, empirical findings have shown that stock prices on the 
ex-dividend days decrease by the amount of significantly less than the dividend. 
Different explanations for this phenomenon have been proposed. The tax 
hypothesis argues that dividends are discounted in value against capital gains as a 
direct consequence of a higher tax burden on dividends than on capital gains. 
Examples of supporters of the tax hypothesis include Barclay (1997), Bell and 
Jenkinson (2002), Elton and Gruber (1970), Elton et al. (2005), Green and Rydqvist 
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(1999), Lasfer (1995), Lasfer and Zenonos (2003), Milonas et al. (2006) and Francis 
et al. (2012). The short-term trading hypothesis provides an alternative proposition. 
According to Kalay (1982), how dividends are valued against capital gains can also 
be conditional upon the level of transaction costs incurred by short-term investors 
around the ex-days. Evidence in support of the short-term trading hypothesis is 
provided by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), Karpoff and Walkling (1990) and 
Athanassakos (1996) when they find significant abnormal trading volumes around 
the ex-days with positive abnormal returns before, and negative abnormal returns 
after, the ex-days. The interpretation of the ex-day stock price behaviour is further 
complicated by the tax heterogeneity argument and the market microstructure 
explanations. Michaely and Vila (1995) argue that tax heterogeneity among 
investors can trigger trading around the ex-day. It follows that trading around the 
ex-days is then the result of the interaction between investors in different tax 
brackets. If this is the case, the ex-day price would not be determined by a single 
tax bracket. Market microstructure explanations interpret the ex-day price 
behaviour based on variables such as price discreteness, bid-ask bounce and limit 
order adjustments. The main argument by supporters of the market microstructure 
explanations is that even in the absence of taxes and transaction costs, the stock 
price on the ex-day is unlikely to fall by the exact amount of dividend due to market 
microstructure factors such as price discreteness, bid-ask bounce and limit order 
adjustments. 
This study aims at adding to a large body of empirical evidence on the determinants 
of the ex-day price and volume behaviour by exploring a unique research setting in 
Vietnam where dividends tax rate has never been higher than capital gains tax rate. 
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Evidence from this study would provide a new insight into how investors value 
dividends and validate the tax hypothesis about the impact of the differential tax 
treatment between dividends and capital gains on dividend value. The study is also 
expected to provide more direct evidence on how the market value of dividends is 
affected by the level of state ownership in a firm. Up to date, the relation between 
ownership structure and the market value of dividends is rather underexplored since 
the focus of empirical studies has been on examining the impact of ownership 












CHAPTER 3  
 
INSTITUTIONAL SETTINGS OF THE VIETNAMESE MARKET 
 
This chapter discusses relevant institutional features of the Vietnamese stock 
market. Section 3.1 explains the equitisation process and the importance of 
incorporating state ownership to the study about the impact of taxes on the market 
value of dividends. Section 3.2 reviews the development process of the stock market 
in Vietnam and the mechanism under which stocks are traded. The situation of 
dividend policies of Vietnamese listed firms is also presented. Finally, this chapter 
highlights the uniqueness of the tax condition in Vietnam compared to other 
markets in previous research.  
3.1. Equitisation Process in Vietnam 
 
As part of the State-Owned Enterprise (SOE) Reform Program, the equitisation 
process in Vietnam started in 1992 with a pilot program and the process is still in 
progress (Sjoholm, 2006). Vu (2003) proposes that the equitisation process in 
Vietnam encompasses two stages: the pilot stage (1992 to 1996), which only 
covered the small and medium-sized SOEs, and the extended stage (1996 onward), 
which aimed to speed up the equitisation process. Along with the equitisation 
process, the number of equitised firms has increased significantly over time. With 
only five SOEs equitised by December 1996, the number of equitised firms rose to 
25 by June 1998 and surged to more than 1,000 by the end of 2002. Equitisation in 
Vietnam is defined as the transformation of SOEs into joint-stock companies via 
selling part of the shares in the company to private investors (Sjoholm, 2006). The 
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primary purpose of equitisation is to improve performances of SOEs. Equitisation 
in Vietnam is considered partial privatisation in the sense that the government does 
not lose its ultimate control over the firm. To the contrary, the government still 
holds decisive voting rights and controlling roles in most equitised firms. By the 
end of 2004, of the total equitised firms, the State on average still holds 38.1 percent 
of the total shares (Truong, 2007).8 In a similar manner, in 2012, the State owns 
shares in nearly 60 percent of the total listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Stock 
Exchange. Furthermore, firms in which the State owns more than 50 percent of the 
shares account for 23.6 percent of the total number of listed firms.9 In important 
economic sectors such as telecommunications, airlines, natural gas and railroad, the 
government is still the dominant shareholder (Vo, 2013). 
3.2. Vietnam’s Stock Market and Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange 
 
3.2.1. History of Vietnam’s Stock Market 
 
The stock market in Vietnam started its operation in 2000 with the establishment of 
Ho Chi Minh Securities Trading Center (HoSTC). Up to now, the development 
process of the Vietnam’s stock market can be divided into three periods as follows:  
Period 1: From its first day of establishment in 2000 to 2005,  
Period 2: From its peak in 2006 to pre-global financial crisis in 2007 and  
Period 3: From the slowdown in 2008 to the current time (Tran, 2011).   
 
                                                          
8 State capital in equitised firms is supervised by State Capital Investment Corporation. 




Period 1 covers the time with a very small number of listed companies, inactive 
trading and incomplete legal framework. As of December 2005, the number of 
listed companies was only 32 with total market capitalisation of VND 6,337 
million. The Vietnamese stock market set its peak in Period 2 from 2006 to 2007 
when VNIndex jumped to nearly 1,200 points in March 2007.10 This period also 
observed a surge in the number of listed companies and the level of market 
capitalisation. With 138 listed companies, the total market capitalisation of the Ho 
Chi Minh Stock Exchange reached VND 361,000 billion. However, the boom did 
not last long and the stock market in Vietnam experienced a downturn in Period 3 
as a result of the global financial crisis. VNIndex plummeted and reached 235.18 
points in February 2009. Since 2010, the stock market has been fairly stable and 
VNIndex has revolved around 400–500 points. However, there is no sign that it can 
revert back to its heyday of 2006–2007 in the near future. 
3.2.2. Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE) 
 
Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (previously known as Ho Chi Minh City Securities 
Trading Center) was officially put into operation and executed the first trading 
session on 28 July 2000. With the development of the stock market, the number of 
companies listed on the HOSE has increased rapidly. With only 62 companies 
registered to be members in 2007, as of December 2012, the total number of listed 
companies has surged to 306 and the HOSE now accounts for more than 85 percent 
of the total market capitalisation of the stock market in Vietnam.  
                                                          




Prior to 4 September 2012, the HOSE operated under the rule T+4. If an investor 
buys a stock on business day T, he must wait until business day T+4 for the stock 
to be put into his account and it is only on and after business day T+4 that he can 
sell the stock.11 From 4 September 2012, rule T+4 is replaced by T+3 which means 
that investors are allowed to sell their previously bought stocks one day earlier. For 
example, if Investor A buys 1,000 units of stock X on day T, Wednesday 26 June 
2013, then business day T+3 is on Monday 1 July 2013. Only on and after Monday 
1 July 2013 can Investor A sell his 1,000 units of stock X that he bought on 
Wednesday 26 June 2013. 
Trading on the HOSE is conducted through a computerised system. The HOSE is 
different from the NYSE in that there is no specialist or market maker. Investors 
are required to set up their account in a securities firm and all transactions must be 
initiated from stockbrokers of the firm. Transaction orders from securities firms will 
then be registered into the trading system by the representatives of the firms on the 
exchange floor. Buying orders and selling orders are matched to determine the price 
(see Appendix 1).12 
3.3. Dividend Policies of Vietnamese Listed Companies 
 
3.3.1. Overview of Dividend Policies of Vietnamese Listed Companies 
 
There are two forms of dividend payment made by Vietnamese listed firms: cash 
dividends and stock dividends. Some firms distribute profits in both forms at the 
same time. Firms can pay dividends quarterly, semi-annually or annually. Once the 
                                                          
11 The rule T+4 is specified in HOSE’s Regulation on Time of Payment. 
12 Trading mechanism is specified in HOSE’s Regulation on Trading. 
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company makes a dividend announcement, it also announces ex-dividend day, 
record day and payment day. To be entitled to receive dividends, investors must 
purchase shares before the ex-day. Investors whose names are recorded as 
shareholders on the record day are entitled to the dividends. The record day is two 
business days after the ex-day in Vietnam. Finally, dividends are delivered on the 
announced payment day. 
In Vietnam, companies normally announce cash dividend per share as a percentage 
of the face or the par value of the stock.13 For example, 10 percent or 20 percent 
dividend per share of the stock’s face value means a shareholder is entitled to a 
dividend of VND 1,000 or VND 2,000 per share respectively. Figure 3.1 depicts 
the mean dividend per share of Vietnamese listed companies on the HOSE from 
2001 to 2009. Over the period, the level of dividend per share (DPS) was fairly 
stable despite fluctuations in corporate income; particularly from 2005 to 2009, the 
mean DPS of Vietnamese listed companies remained at around VND 1,400. In 
2008, many companies experienced drastic decreases in profit but the dividend 
made remained unchanged. Then in 2009, incomes of these companies were 
significantly improved but dividends per share were not increased. And since 
companies were reluctant to change dividend per share, dividend payout ratio 
fluctuated over time as earnings per share changed (Nguyen, 2011).14 As illustrated 
in Figure 3.2, with the stable mean DPS of approximately VND 1,400 from 2005 
to 2007, the mean annual payout ratio varied greatly with 93.3 percent in 2005, 
plummeted to 47.3 percent in 2006 and 41.2 percent in 2007. Some companies even 
                                                          
13 Face or par value of a stock is equal to VND 10,000. 






paid dividends out of negative earnings. The most notable case was FPT Company 
in 2007. FPT announced a DPS of VND 2,500 per share while incurring a negative 
EPS of VND –7,481 per share.  
Figure 3.1: Dividend per Share (DPS) of Vietnamese Listed Companies  
This figure depicts the mean annual dividend per share of Vietnamese listed companies on 
the HOSE from 2001 to 2009. Dividend per Share is calculated as at 31 December and is 









Figure 3.2: Payout Ratio (DPR) of Vietnamese Listed Companies 
This figure depicts the mean annual payout ratio of Vietnamese listed companies on the 
HOSE from 2001 to 2009. Dividend payout ratio is calculated as Dividend per 
Share/Earnings per Share in which annual Dividend per Share and annual Earnings per 
Share are calculated as at 31 December and are recorded in the annual financial report of 



















































3.3.2. Dividend Policies of Vietnamese Listed Companies based on State 
Ownership 
 
Along with year-to-year fluctuations, the payout ratio also varies among companies 
with different levels of state ownership. Based on information collected from firms’ 
annual reports, Table 3.1 presents the mean annual payout ratio of listed companies 
on the HOSE by year and state ownership. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei 
et al. (2003), the level of state ownership is partitioned into three groups: High, 
Medium and Low. Accordingly, state ownership is high if the State holds more than 
50 percent of the total shares of the company, is medium if the State holds between 
20 to 50 percent of the total shares and is low if the proportion of shares held by the 
State is less than 20 percent. Except in 2011, companies within the “High” group 
consistently paid out the highest portion of earnings as dividends. Moreover, the 
mean payout ratio is higher for the “High” group and the test of difference confirms 
a statistically significant difference in payout ratios across the three groups in 2008, 
2010 and 2012. The pattern is consistent with what is found in China. Wei et al. 
(2003) report Chinese firms with higher state ownership pay higher cash dividends. 
The underlying reason as argued by Wei et al. (2003) is that shares owned by the 
State cannot be publicly traded, therefore providing no avenue for accessing capital 
gains for the State. By the same token, higher dividend payouts associated with a 
higher state ownership can then be interpreted as a means for Vietnamese 






                    Table 3.1: Payout Ratio of Listed Companies on the HOSE by Year and State Ownership 
This table presents the mean annual payout ratio of listed companies on the HOSE from 2008 to 2012 by state ownership. 
Payout ratio is calculated as Dividend per share/Earnings per share. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei et al. 
(2003), the level of state ownership is high if the State holds more than 50 percent of the total shares, is medium if the 
State holds between 20 to 50 percent of the total shares and is low if the State holds less than 20 percent of the total shares 
of the company. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 Year 
State Ownership 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
High (>50%) 53.6% 43.2% 23.9% 43.8% 49.2% 
Medium (20%–50%) 50.4% 25.6% 20.6% 44.5% 23.1% 
Low (<20%) 34.1% 29.2% 11.7% 45.5% 10.7% 
Test of difference between 
High, Medium and Low 




3.4. Tax Mechanism in Vietnam 
 
Currently, Vietnam operates a classic tax system in which dividends are taxed at 
both corporate and personal levels. Dividends are paid out of after-tax corporate 
income. Dividends then become part of personal income and are taxed at the 
personal income tax rate. Both residents and non-residents are subject to flat tax 
rates on dividends and capital gains. With regards to other assessable incomes, 
Vietnamese residents are taxed progressively at a rate of up to 35 percent while a 
flat rate of 20 percent is applied to non-residents. 
Corporate income tax in Vietnam is regulated by the Law on Enterprise Income Tax 
which was promulgated by the National Assembly in June 2008. According to 
Article 10 of this law, from 1 January 2009, the standard corporate tax rate is 25 
percent. In case of firms operating business activities related to prospecting, 
exploring, exploiting oil and gas and other rare natural resources, the corporate tax 
rate ranges between 32 percent and 50 percent. Prior to 2009, the standard corporate 
income tax rate was 28 percent. 
Under the Vietnamese taxation law, dividends tax rate has never been higher than 
capital gains tax rate. Since 2006, there have been three significant changes in tax 
regulations. Prior to 30 June 2010, there was no tax on either dividends or capital 
gains. The Law on Personal Income Tax 2007 stipulated a dividends tax rate of five 
percent and a capital gains tax rate of 20 percent which applied to dividends 
received and capital gains realised after 1 July 2010. In 2011, due to economic 
difficulties and stock market downturn associated with the impact of the Global 
Financial Crisis, the National Assembly approved Resolution 08/2011/QH13 which 
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removed tax on dividend income and reduced the capital gains tax rate by half. 
Consequently, the sample period can be divided into three sub-periods where 
different tax rates on dividends and capital gains are applicable. The summary table 
is presented as follows: 
 
Table 3.2 : Regulations and Tax Schemes 
 
 
The dividends and capital gains tax rates in Period 2 and Period 3 from 1 July 2010 
to 31 December 2012 contribute to the uniqueness of the Vietnamese market 
compared to other countries in previous research. While some studies have 
examined countries during the periods of no tax on either dividends or capital gains 
such as Hong Kong and Oman, little attention has been paid to the case where 
capital gains are more heavily taxed than dividends. One possible explanation for 
the lighter taxation treatment on dividends than on capital gains in Vietnam is 
because investors are “playing with” rather than investing in stocks (Nguyen et al., 
2011). This implies that a high level of tax rate on capital gains may play a role in 
curbing short-term trading. Nonetheless, the motive behind Vietnamese regulators 
placing capital gains in such tax disadvantaged positions compared to dividends 
still remains puzzling. 
Period      Date 
Tax rate (%) 
Regulations 
Dividends Capital gains 
1 
1 January 2006 –  
30 June 2010 0 0 None 
2 
1 July 2010 –  
31 July 2011 5 20 
Law on Personal 
Income Tax 
3 
1 August 2011 – 





3.5. Summary of the Institutional Settings of the Study 
 
This study is conducted using information of Vietnamese listed companies on the 
HOSE in Vietnam. The tax mechanism in Vietnam is featured by flat tax rates on 
both dividends and capital gains. More interestingly, the tax rates on dividends have 
never been higher than on capital gains. The equitisation process in Vietnam also 
provides an important foundation for this study in that many of the listed firms on 
the HOSE are equitised SOEs. As before, the State still holds a significant 
















CHAPTER 4  
 
HYPOTHESES, DATA AND METHODS 
 
This chapter discusses how hypotheses for this study are developed and tested. 
Section 4.1 derives eight hypotheses based on the relevant literature in Chapter 2 
and the background of the Vietnamese market in Chapter 3. Section 4.2 describes 
the source of data for the study. In Section 4.3, details of the hypothesis testing 
procedures are outlined. Finally, a summary of hypotheses and hypothesis testing 
techniques is provided in Section 4.4. 
4.1. Development of Hypotheses 
 
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the differential tax treatment between dividends 
and capital gains is the major driving force of the ex-day behaviour of stocks. They 
propose that the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to capital gains causes the 
ex-day drop-off ratio to be smaller than one. Such arguments rest in the following 
equation: 













         (1) 
From 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (i.e. Period 1), there were neither taxes on 
dividends nor on capital gains. Setting 
dt  and gt  as zero leads to equation (2) below: 









From the equation (2) above, the following hypothesis is expected to be accepted: 
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are not 
different from one. 
From 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (i.e. Period 2) and from 1 August 2011 to 31 
December 2012 (i.e. Period 3), the dividends tax rate was consistently higher than 









 should be greater than one. As a result, 
equation (1) can be expressed as:  




  > 1                                  (3) 
Equation (3) above shows that when dividends are taxed at a lower rate than capital 
gains, the following two hypotheses are expected to be accepted: 
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are greater than 
one. 
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period 3) are 
greater than one. 
Kalay (1982) argues that the relative difference between dividends and capital gains 
tax cannot fully explain the ex-day price behaviour if short-term traders are active 
around the ex-days. The presence of short-term trading activity can be proved if 
abnormal trading volumes are significant (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986). In 
this study, the sample period from 2006 to 2012 is partitioned into three sub-periods 
based on different levels of dividends and capital gains tax rate. Nonetheless, if the 
ex-day price behaviour is influenced by short-term traders, positive abnormal 
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volumes are expected in all three sub-periods. Therefore, the following hypothesis 
is tested and is expected to be accepted: 
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods are greater than zero. 
The ability of short-term traders to make profits is largely affected by the level of 
transaction costs. Higher transaction costs reduce short-term traders’ incentive 
thereby depressing the level of abnormal volumes around the ex-day (Karpoff and 
Walkling, 1988). Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) also argue that transaction 
costs are higher for low-yielding stock. Therefore, the acceptance of the following 
hypotheses will suggest that abnormal trading around the ex-day is triggered by 
short-term investors. 
H5a: Abnormal volumes are negatively correlated to transaction costs. 
H5b: Abnormal volumes are positively correlated to dividend yields. 
Abnormal returns around the ex-days are used in short-term trading analysis to 
identify investors’ preference toward dividends. If investors are lured by dividends 
so that dividend capture activities by short-term traders result around the ex-day, 
abnormal returns are expected to be positive before the ex-day as a result of 
increased buying pressure and turn negative after the ex-day to reflect increased 
selling pressure (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer, 1995). The following 
hypothesis is expected to be accepted in the Vietnamese market: 
H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the ex-days and become negative on and 
after the ex-days. 
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Michaely and Vila (1995) argue that tax heterogeneity among investors affects the 
behaviour of short-term traders around the ex-days. They also find that when the 
difference between dividends and capital gains tax is widened, the level of short-
term trading around the ex-days is higher. If tax is taken into consideration by short-
term traders on the HOSE, after 1 July 2010 when dividends have a tax advantage 
relative to capital gains, abnormal trading volumes will be higher compared to when 
dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate are equal. If it is the case, the following 
hypothesis should be accepted: 
H7: Abnormal volumes are higher after 1 July 2010. 
Under the agency cost theory, Easterbrook (1984) argues that dividends act to 
reduce the amount of free cash flow that might be wasted by the managers. 
Recently, Vojtech (2012) proves that dividend policies can limit information 
asymmetry between insiders and outsiders. That is, information asymmetry is lower 
for dividend paying companies than for non-dividend paying companies. Studies 
using agency theory have also reported a correlation between ownership structure 
and dividend policy of the firm. Jensen et al. (1992) find that a higher insider 
ownership is associated with a lower dividend payout among US firms. Similarly, 
Short et al. (2002) document a negative association between dividend payout and 
managerial ownership. In Asian markets, Wei et al. (2003) report that Chinese firms 
with higher state ownership pay higher cash dividends. To the degree that 
ownership structure can influence dividend policies, which in turn affect the level 
of agency problems of the company, it is hypothesised that there is a correlation 
between how dividends are valued relative to capital gains and the ownership 
structure of the company. Ownership structure of Vietnamese listed companies in 
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this study is characterised by a high concentration of state ownership; therefore, the 
following hypothesis is tested: 




The sample used in this research includes 265 dividend paying firms during the 
period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. Information about dividend 
payments, ex-dividend days, and stock prices of Vietnamese listed companies on 
the HOSE was obtained from Thomson Reuters Tick History and Securities 
Industry Research Centre of Asia-Pacific (SIRCA). The one-year interest rate on 
Vietnamese government notes were also collected from SIRCA. Trading volumes 
and market index during the study period were acquired through cafef.vn and 
hsx.vn.15 Finally, information on ownership structure was compiled manually from 
annual reports of the listed companies on the HOSE. 
4.3. Methods 
 
In this study, I make several comparisons of drop-off ratios, abnormal volumes and 
abnormal returns. First, drop-off ratios are computed for three sub-periods with 
different levels of tax rates on dividends and capital gains. Both mean and median 
drop-off ratios in each sub-period are then tested against one. Secondly, 
observations in each period are sub-divided based on state ownership into high, 
medium and low state ownership. The drop-off ratios across three state ownership 
                                                          
15 cafef.vn is a website synthetising trading information from all stock trading centres in Vietnam. 
hsx.vn is the official website of Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange. 
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levels are then compared and tested for difference to examine how the market value 
of dividends is affected by ownership structure. Third, abnormal volumes and 
abnormal returns around the ex-days are tested against zero to examine the 
significance of short-term trading around the ex-days. In addition to univariate 
analysis, regression analysis is performed to control for other factors which may 
affect the ex-day behaviour. 
4.3.1. Drop-off Ratio Comparisons 
 
The study uses both raw and market adjusted drop-off ratios. The raw and market 
adjusted drop-off ratios are computed as follows:                    















in which Pcum is the closing stock price on the day before the ex-day, Pex is the 
closing stock price on the ex-day, Icum represents market index on the day before 
the ex-day and Iex represents market index on the ex-day. 
To test hypotheses H1, H2 and H3, the comparisons of DR and Adj DR are 
conducted using both parametric t-test and non-parametric Wilcoxon signed-rank 





4.3.2. Trading Activities around the Ex-days 
 
4.3.2.1. Abnormal Trading Volumes 
 
To calculate abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days, this research uses event 
study method [see Brown and Warner (1980); Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986)]. 
Each ex-day is referred to as an event. Following Lakonishok and Vermalen (1986), 
abnormal trading volumes are calculated for a trading window of 11 days 
encompassing five days before and after and the ex-day itself. The daily abnormal 




in which V is the daily trading volume 
and NV is the estimated normal trading volume. Following the work of Callaghan 
and Barry (2003), normal trading volume is estimated as the mean of daily trading 
volumes over two periods: day 45 to day 15 before the ex-day and day 15 to day 45 
after the ex-day.  
To test Hypothesis H4, abnormal trading volumes are tested against zero using the 
standardization procedure. The standardization procedure was first introduced by 
Brown and Warner (1980) and was later utilized by Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986), Callaghan and Barry (2003), and Jun et al. (2008) to test the significance of 
abnormal volumes. The standardization procedure is as follows. 
The standardized abnormal volume is first calculated as: 







tSAV  is the standardized abnormal volume on day t, 
ˆ( )tS AV is the 
estimated standard deviation of AVt in the control period from day 45 to day 15 
before the ex-day and day 15 to day 45 after the ex-day. 
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in which tSAV is the mean standardized abnormal trading volume on day t, N is 
the number of ex-day events. 







in which ˆ( )S SAV  is the estimated standard deviation of tSAV  calculated from the 
control period of (– 45 to – 15) and (15 to 45). 
4.3.2.2. Cumulative Abnormal Volumes 
 
To test hypotheses H5a, H5b and H7, following Michaely and Vila (1996), 





CAV AV  
4.3.2.3. Abnormal Returns  
 
To test Hypothesis H6, following Lakoniskok and Vermaelen (1986), abnormal 
returns are calculated for a trading period of 11 days encompassing the ex-day. 
Following Callaghan and Barry (2003), abnormal return is calculated in the 
following way: 
ABRETi,t = (RETi,t – rf,t) – (α + β(rm,t – rf,t))  (4) 
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in which rf,t is the one-year interest rate on Vietnamese government notes, rm,t is the 
daily return of VNINDEX on day t, ABRETi,t is the abnormal return of stock i on 
day t, RETi,t is the daily return of stock i on day t. RET for five days before, five 
days after the ex-day and on the ex-day are calculated as follows: 
For days (– 5,– 1) and (1,5):  RETi,t = (Pi,t  – Pi,t-1)/ Pi,t-1 
For the ex-day:   RETi,0 = (Pex – Pcum + D)/Pcum 
α and β in equation (4) are estimated based on a market model for each event in the 
control periods from day 45 to day 15 before the ex-day and from day 15 to day 45 
after the ex-day: 
ri,t – rf ,t = α+ β(rm,t – rf,t) + ε 
in which rf,t is the one-year interest rate on Vietnamese government notes, ri,t is the 
daily return of stock i on day t and rm,t is the daily return of VNINDEX on day t.  
As argued by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) and Lasfer (1995), the trading 
pattern on a certain day can be identified based on abnormal return on that day since 
a positive abnormal return is associated with increased buying pressure and 
negative abnormal return is associated with selling pressure. 
4.3.3. Regression Analysis 
 
4.3.3.1. Regression Analysis on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios and Ex-day Abnormal 
Returns 
 
Ex-day abnormal returns are used to complement ex-day drop-off ratios in regression 
analysis since drop-off ratios might suffer from heteroskedasticity (Eades et al., 
1984). A drop-off ratio of less than one is expected to result in positive ex-day 
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abnormal return and vice versa. In other words, a higher abnormal return would 
imply a lower market value of dividends. To test Hypothesis H8, ex-day drop-off 
ratios and ex-day abnormal returns are regressed based on the following models: 
DRi,t = α + β0Sizei,t + β1DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +  
                               +β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε                                 (5) 
ABRETi,t = α + β0Sizei,t + β1DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t + 
                      + β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε                                         (6) 
in which: the control variables of DY and Size are based on Kadapakkam et al. 
(2010) while the dummy variables are used to indicate the sub-periods in which a 
change in dividends and capital gains tax occurs. DY represents Dividend Yield 
while Size represents the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation.16 State 
ownership refers to the proportion of shares owned by the State. Dummy variables 
are included to allow for the changes in the differential tax treatment between 
dividends and capital gains. Dummy if period 2 takes the value of one if the dividend 
payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero otherwise. Dummy 
if period 3 takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1 August 2011 
and zero otherwise. 
4.3.3.2. Regression Analysis on Abnormal Volumes  
 
If abnormal volumes around the ex-days are significant on the HOSE, following 
Kalay (1982) and Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), it is hypothesized that the 
arbitrage activity of short-term traders are affected by factors such as transaction 
                                                          
16 Market Capitalisation = Stock price* Number of Outstanding shares. 
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costs and risks. Accordingly, to test Hypotheses H5a, H5b and H7, cumulative 
abnormal volumes are regressed using the following model: 
CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t + 
              +β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε             (7) 
The control variables beta, Size and DY are based on Michaely and Vila (1996). 
DY represents Dividend Yield while Size represents the natural logarithm of 
Market Capitalisation. Following relevant previous research [see Karpoff and 
Walkling (1988); Cloyd et al. (2004); Al Yahyaee et al. (2008)], 1/Pcum is used as a 
proxy for transaction cost. Karpoff and Walkling (1988) report a positive 
correlation between 1/Pcum and transaction cost. Therefore, a higher 1/Pcum would 
indicate a higher transaction cost for the stock. Dummy if period 2 takes the value of 
one if the dividend payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and 
zero otherwise. Dummy if period 3 takes the value of one if the dividend payment is 
made after 1 August 2011 and zero otherwise. 
4.3.3.3. Regression Techniques 
 
(a) OLS Regression 
Equation (5), (6) and (7) are first estimated using OLS method. The presence of 
heteroskedasticity is tested using White’s test and Breusch–Pagan test. 
Autocorrelation is diagnosed using Durbin–Watson statistic and Breusch–Godfrey 
serial correlation LM Test. When only heteroskedasticity exists, OLS standard 
errors are corrected using White’s heteroskedasticity consistent covariance 
estimators. When only autocorrelation exists, data are transformed using Cochrane–
Orcutt procedure. When both heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation are present in 





(b) Robust Regression 
When the data suffer from the presence of outliers, robust regression provides a 
better regression estimation compared to OLS. Robust regression has previously 
been used in literature to estimate the market value of dividends [see Davidson and 
Mallin (1989); Armitage, Hodgkinson and Partington (2006)]. Unlike OLS, robust 
regression assigns unequal weight to each observation with outliers receiving 
smaller weights. In this study, the allocation of weight to observations is determined 
using Hubert weight. 
(c) Panel Regression 
Panel regression is used to deal with two-dimensional data which are usually 
collected over time and over the same individuals. The use of panel regression in 
financial studies was first introduced by Frankel and Rose (1996). For the current 
study, each company typically distributed dividends more than once during the 
sample period; therefore, panel regression is used.17 The Hausman test is used to 
determine whether the random effects or the fixed effects model is more efficient. 
The random effects model is applicable when the individual stock effects are 
uncorrelated with the independent variables. In contrast, the fixed effects model is 




                                                          
17 A stock with only one observation during the sample period is eliminated from panel regression. 
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4.4. Summary of Hypotheses, Data and Methods 
 
The current study aims to examine the impact of taxes and state ownership on the 
market value of dividends using both univariate and multivariate analyses. Table 
4.1 provides a summary of hypotheses to be tested and the techniques used to test 
each hypothesis. Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 test the impact of the differential tax 
treatment between dividends and capital gains on the market value of dividends. 
Elton and Gruber (1970) argue that the value of dividends is discounted against 
capital gains due to a heavier tax rate on dividends. If the difference between 
dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate affects how dividends are valued 
relative to capital gains in the Vietnamese market, hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are 
expected to be accepted. The impact of taxes on the market value of dividends is 
hypothesised to be weakened when abnormal trading is triggered around the ex-day 
by short-term traders. The acceptance of hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 will indicate 
the existence of short-term trading around the ex-days. Hypothesis H7 is tested to 
investigate whether the differential tax treatment on dividends and on capital gains 
affect the short-term trading around the ex-days. Finally, the impact of ownership 









Table 4.1: Summary of Hypotheses and Hypothesis Testing Technique 
Hypothesis Hypothesis Testing Technique 
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 
June 2010 (Period 1) are not different from one. 
Univariate analysis:  
 Direct comparisons of the mean and 
median drop-off ratios 
 Test of difference (against 1): t-test and 
Wilcoxon signed ranks test  
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 
2011 (Period 2) are greater than one. 
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31 
December 2012 (Period 3) are greater than one. 
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods 
are greater than zero. 
Univariate analysis: 
 Direct comparison of abnormal 
volumes and 0 
H5a: Abnormal volumes are negatively correlated 
to transaction costs.  
Multivariate analysis: 
 Regression of abnormal volumes on 
transaction costs 
H5b: Abnormal volumes are positively correlated 
to dividend yields. 
Univariate analysis: 
 Direct comparison of abnormal 
volumes among different level of 
dividend yields 
And multivariate analysis: 
 Regression of abnormal volumes on 
dividend yields 
H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the ex-
days and become negative on and after the ex-
days. 
Univariate analysis: 
 Direct comparison of abnormal returns 
and 0 
H7: Abnormal volumes are higher after 1 July 
2010. 
Univariate analysis: 
 Direct comparison of abnormal 
volumes among 3 sub-periods 
And multivariate analysis: 
 Regression of abnormal volumes on the 
two dummy variables of Period 2 and 
Period 3 
H8: There is a relationship between state 
ownership and the market value of dividends. 
Univariate analysis: 
 Direct comparison of drop-off ratios 
among different level of ownership 
structure 
And multivariate analysis: 
 Regression of ex-day drop-off ratios 
and regression of ex-day abnormal 
returns on state ownership 
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CHAPTER 5  
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
This chapter outlines the empirical results on drop-off ratios, abnormal volumes and 
abnormal returns to assist the hypothesis testing procedure. All results from 
univariate analysis will be provided in Section 5.1, followed by comprehensive 
regression analysis in Section 5.2. Finally, Section 5.3 provides a summary of how 
univariate analysis and regression analysis lead to the acceptance or rejection of the 
hypotheses presented in Section 4.4 Chapter 4. Also included in Section 5.3 are the 
conclusions on the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of 
dividends in the Vietnamese market and how state ownership can act as a 
moderating factor in explaining the ex-day stock price behaviour. 
5.1. Univariate Analysis 
 
5.1.1. Drop-off Ratios 
 
To minimise potential problems of confounding effects caused by other 
announcements, an ex-dividend day is chosen only if there is no other important 
corporate event on that day such as earnings announcement, stock dividends, stock 
split or rights issues. The ex-day event is eliminated if there is no trade on either the 
cum-dividend day or the ex-day. These selection criteria leave a data set of 1,413 
cash dividend events.  
Table 5.1 provides a summary of descriptive statistics of dividend variables 
observed during the sample period. The mean dividend yield of the full sample is 
4.74 percent. That level of dividend yield is relatively high compared to the mean 
dividend yield in some other markets such as 2.3 percent in the US (Zhang et al., 
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2008) and 2.1 percent in Australia (Jun et al., 2008). The mean raw drop-off ratio 
(DRraw) and adjusted drop-off ratio (DRadj) are both close to one at 0.97 and 0.94 
respectively. DRraw and DRadj are then computed for the three sub-periods where 





                    Table 5.1: Descriptive Statistics of Dividend Variables 
This table outlines descriptive statistics for the full sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. It consists of 1,413 ex-dividend events 
of Vietnamese listed companies on the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE). Pcum and Pex are the closing price on the cum-day and the ex-
day respectively. D is the amount of dividend in Vietnamese Dong (VND). DY is calculated as the ratio of dividend to Pcum. DR is calculated 
as (Pcum-Pex)/D. Market-adjusted drop-off ratios (DRadj) are calculated from drop-off ratios after adjusting Pcum by the ratio of market index 
on the ex-day (Iex) to market index on the cum-day (Icum). 
                 Pcum(VND)                 Pex(VND)               D (VND) DY (%) DRraw DRadj 
Mean 35,848.06 34,763.80 1,083.80 4.74 0.97 0.94 
Median 26,000.00 25,000.00 1,000.00 3.85 0.80 0.81 
Stdev 37,862.72 37,886.62 598.68 3.62 2.24 2.32 
Minimum 4,400.00 4,100.00 100.00 0.19 – 20.00  – 20.75  




5.1.1.1. Period with No Tax on either Dividends or Capital Gains (Period 1) 
 
Period 1, from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010, is the period with no tax on either 
dividends or capital gains. As argued by Elton and Gruber (1970), if the tax 
differential between dividends and capital gains drives the ex-day price, then for 
the period with no such differential, the drop-off ratio should be one and the 
following hypothesis H1 should be accepted. 
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are not 
different from one. 
Table 5.2 provides a summary of drop-off ratios and market-adjusted drop-off ratios 
for Period 1. The mean drop-off ratio and adjusted drop-off ratio are 1.031 and 
1.006 respectively. Both t-test and Signed Rank test prove that DRraw and DRadj in 
this period with neither tax on dividends nor on capital gains are not statistically 
different from one, leading to the acceptance of Hypothesis H1. This result is 
different from evidence found in other markets which do not impose taxes on 
dividends and capital gains. For example, both Frank and Jagannathan (1998) and 
Al Yahyaee et al. (2008) report a mean drop-off ratio significantly lower than one 
in Hong Kong and Oman respectively during the period of no dividends and capital 
gains taxes. This result, however, is supportive of the tax-based explanation of the 







                   Table 5.2: Summary of DRs and Adjusted DRs in Period 1 
This table provides a summary of drop-off ratios and market-adjusted drop-off ratios for Period 1. To calculate market-adjusted drop-off 
ratios, Pcum is adjusted by the ratio of market index on the ex-day (Iex) to market index on the cum-day (Icum). In this period, there was no tax 
on either dividends or capital gains, that is td=tg=0. 
a
 : p > 0.05 H0: DR=1 using one-sample t test, 
b
: p > 0.05 H0: DR =1 using Signed Rank 
test. 
 DRraw                           DRadj 
Mean 1.03 1.00 
Median 0.80 0.88 
Test H0: DR=1 
t = 0.28a 
S = –8132b 
t = 0.05a 




5.1.1.2. Periods with Differential Dividends and Capital Gains Tax Treatment 
(Periods 2 and 3) 
 
Following Period 1, Period 2, from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011, is the period when 
Vietnam experiences a differential treatment on dividends and capital gains 
incomes as a result of tax regulation changes. From 1 July 2010, Law on Personal 
Income tax required all dividend incomes to be taxed at five percent while imposing 
a much larger tax rate of 20 percent on capital gains income.  
Period 3 arises as a result of Resolution QH08/2011 coming into effect. From 
August 2011 to December 2012, dividends and capital gains were taxed at zero 
percent and 10 percent respectively. Accordingly, if the tax hypothesis is true, a 
change in the tax code is expected to influence the market value of dividends during 
both Period 2 and Period 3. For the case of Vietnam, it is expected that during the 
time that dividends were taxed at a lower rate than capital gains, drop-off ratios 
should increase to a value greater than one. The following two hypotheses are 
tested: 
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are greater than 
one. 
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period 3) are 
greater than one. 
The mean DRraw (DRadj) in Period 2 and Period 3 are 0.9437 (0.8832) and 0.9072 
(0.8854) respectively and they are not statistically different from one at any 
conventional level using both one-sample t-test and Signed Rank test. The results 
lead to the rejection of both Hypothesis H2 and Hypothesis H3 and are not 
consistent with the prediction of the tax hypothesis that a lower tax rate on dividends 
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than on capital gains should produce greater-than-one drop-off ratios. Furthermore, 
the Kruskal–Wallis test confirms that there is no statistically significant difference 
in both DRraw and DRadj across the three periods. In other words, a lower tax rate 
on dividends than on capital gains did not lead to an increased value of dividends. 
The results indicate that the relative difference between dividends tax rate and 
capital gains tax rates does not significantly influence the market value of dividends 
in Vietnam. This is consistent with some previous studies that find dividends and 
capital gains tax rate to be uncorrelated with the ex-day drop-off ratios. For 
example, Michaely (1991) finds no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios in the US 
market when the differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains was 
removed. In a similar manner, Daunfeldt (2002) provides evidence against the tax 
hypothesis in Sweden when he reports no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios 
following substantial changes in the tax policy.18 The explanations for this 
phenomenon of lower-than-one drop-off ratio vary greatly. It might be due to the 
ability of investors to defer capital gains realization so that the effective tax rate on 
capital gains is still lower than the effective tax rate on dividends (Zhang et al., 
2008). Another possible explanation rests in the activities of short-term traders 
around the ex-days. Kalay (1982) argues that when short-term trading is present 
around the ex-days, it is the transaction cost, not the relative tax rates on dividends 
and capital gains, that determines the ex-day drop-off ratios.  
 
                                                          
18 During the sample period from 1988 to 1995, Daunfelt (2002) reports six significant changes in 
the marginal dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. The marginal tax rate is defined as the tax 
rate in the highest tax bracket. From 1988 to 1990: td=tg=54%; in 1991: td=tg=30%; from 1992 to 
1993: td=30%, tg=25%; in 1994: td=0%, tg=12.5%; in 1995: td=tg=30%. 
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                   Table 5.3: Descriptive Statistics of DRs and Adjusted DRs and Test of Difference across Periods 1, 2 and 3 
This table presents drop-off ratios and adjusted drop-off ratios in three periods determined based on different levels of dividends tax rate (td) 
and capital gains tax rate (tg). In Period 1, td =tg= 0%; in Period 2: td = 5%, tg = 20%; in Period 3, td = 0%, tg = 10%. 
c
: p > 0.05 using Kruskal–
Wallis test. 







                                           
  
 
Panel A: Drop-off Ratios 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Mean 1.03 0.94 0.91 
Median 1.00 0.73 0.85 
Obs 695 349 369 
Test of difference between Period 1, Period 2 and Period 3          2 =2.27c   
Panel B: Adjusted Drop-off Ratios 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 
Mean 1.01 0.88 0.89 
Median 0.88 0.76 0.86 
Obs 695 349 369 




5.1.1.3. Drop-off Ratios and State Ownership 
As mentioned earlier in section 3.2 of Chapter 3, after the equitisation process in 
Vietnam, the State still holds the controlling role in most equitised firms (Truong, 
2007). For listed companies on the HOSE which is the focus of this research, as of 
2012, firms in which the State owns more than 50 percent of the shares account for 
23.6 percent of the total number of listed firms.19 This section provides empirical 
results on drop-off ratios in each sub-period based on the level of state ownership 
to test the following hypothesis: 
H8: There is a relationship between state ownership and the market value of 
dividends. 
As presented in Table 5.4, the result is consistent over the three sub-periods that 
both the raw and adjusted drop-off ratios increase along with the level of state 
ownership. And the Kruskal–Wallis test proves that the mean drop-off ratio of stocks 
with high state ownership is the highest in all three sub-periods. This result suggests 
that dividends of stocks with a high level of state ownership are more valuable to 
investors than dividends of stocks with a low level of state ownership. One possible 
explanation for this phenomenon is Vietnamese listed firms with higher state 
ownership tend to pay a higher level of cash dividends. Over the period from 2008 
to 2012, companies with a high level of state ownership show a fairly consistent 
pattern of highest payout ratios.20 This might also be explained from an agency cost 
                                                          
19 This statistic is based on the annual report of 283 listed firms on the HOSE. 
20 Details on payout ratios according to the level of state ownership can be found at section 3.3 
Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
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perspective. Relating state ownership to information asymmetry, Choi, Sami and 
Zhou (2010) argue that state ownership is positively associated with the firm’s 
information asymmetry during the period of inactive control transfer and great 
deviation between cash flows rights and control rights. On the other hand, agency 
cost theory proposes that dividend payment helps to reduce free cash flows which 
might be wasted by the company’s managers otherwise. Vojtech (2012) further 
proves that under the presence of asymmetric information, dividends are used as a 
tool to mitigate agency problems and that the more severe asymmetric information 
problem, the more outside investors prefer dividends compared to retained 
earnings. Therefore, if it is the case in the Vietnamese market that information 
asymmetry is higher for companies with higher state ownership, then information 
asymmetry may have had an influence on the positive correlation between the 
market value of dividends and the level of state ownership. Nonetheless, as the 
positive correlation between state ownership and information asymmetry has not 
been proved in the Vietnamese market, further research would be required to 
explain why dividends of companies with a high level of state ownership are more 
valuable compared to dividends of companies with lower state ownership. 
Observing the drop-off ratios of stocks with high state ownership reveals some 
interesting results. In Period 1, the mean drop-off ratio is 1.206 and is not 
statistically different from one (t=1.08, p>0.1). The median drop-off ratio is 1.333 
and is also not statistically different from one (S= –1142, p>0.1). Similarly, the 
mean and median adjusted drop-off ratio are 1.072 and 0.926 respectively and are 
not statistically different from one (t=0.37, p>0.1; S= –1189, p>0.1). On the other 
hand, the mean drop-off ratios of Period 2 and Period 3 are both statistically greater 
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than one at all conventional levels. A greater-than-one drop-off ratio indicates that 
the market value of dividends is greater than its face value. McDonald (2001) once 
reports a drop-off ratio of 1.26 in Germany which he argues to be the result of the 
tax credit associated with the imputation tax system. However, the pattern of equal-
to-one drop-off ratios in Period 1 and greater-than-one drop-off ratios in Period 2 
and Period 3 is not evident for stocks with low and medium state ownership. The 
mean drop-off ratios of stocks with low state ownership in all three sub-periods are 
significantly smaller than one. For stocks with medium state ownership, the mean 
drop-off ratio in Period 1 of 1.152 is not statistically different from one (t=1.03, 
p>0.1; S= –1038, p>0.1) but the mean drop-off ratios in Period 2 of 0.92 and Period 
3 of 0.68 are both statistically smaller than one. These results on drop-off ratios at 
different levels of state ownership suggest that the tax hypothesis is applicable for 




                     
                    Table 5.4: Drop-off Ratios by State Ownership 
This table presents drop-off ratios in three periods based on three levels of state ownership (SO). Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei 
et al. (2003), state ownership is high, medium and low if the State holds more than 50 percent, from 20 to 50 percent and smaller than 20 
percent of the total number of shares in the company respectively. Market-adjusted drop-off ratios are calculated from drop-off ratios after 
adjusting Pcum by the ratio of market index on the ex-day (Iex) to market index on the cum-day (Icum). The Kruskal–Wallis test is used to test 
for the difference in drop-off ratios and adjusted drop-off ratios among High SO, Medium SO and Low SO. The Kruskal–Wallis test is also 
used to test for the difference in drop-off ratios and adjusted drop-off ratios among three periods. The values of adjusted drop-off ratios and 
corresponding test statistics are reported in parentheses.  The asterisk *** denotes significance at the 1 percent level. 
 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 Test of difference between 
Period 1, Period 2 and Period 3 
High SO: > 50%     
Mean 1.21 (1.07) 1.77 (1.30) 1.59 (1.21) 
2 = 51.49*** (10.15***) Median 1.33 (0.96) 1.33 (1.08) 1.20 (1.08) 
             N 217 90 116 
Medium SO: 20%–50%     
Mean 1.15 (1.12) 0.92 (0.94) 0.68 (0.85) 
         2 = 45.63*** (3.46) Median 0.33 (0.84) 0.67 (0.68) 0.67 (0.87) 
             N 248 131 139 
Low SO: < 20%     
            Mean 0.73 (0.81) 0.39 (0.53) 0.50 (0.62) 
         2 = 6.03 (4.34)             Median 1.00 (0.84) 0.60 (0.58) 0.65 (0.54) 
            N 230 128 114 
Test of difference between High 
SO, Medium SO and Low SO 
2 = 21.55*** (0.302) 2 = 54.63*** (23.05***) 2 = 137.95*** (33.02***)  
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5.1.2. Abnormal Trading Volumes  
 
Kalay (1982) argues that the smaller-than-dividend stock price drop on the ex-
dividend day would provide profitable arbitrage opportunities for short-term 
traders. In that case, the tax hypothesis cannot fully explain the ex-day price 
behaviour since short-term traders are not subject to the differential taxation of 
dividends and capital gains. The presence of short-term trading activity around the 
ex-day can be confirmed by the significance of abnormal trading volumes. 
Empirical studies have reported the existence of short-term traders in complicating 
the ex-day stock price. Documenting positive abnormal volumes around the ex-days 
during the period of 1 January 1970 to 31 December 1981 in the US, Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (1986) argue that the presence of short-term trading makes it 
difficult to verify the tax hypothesis. Similarly, Athanassakos and Fowler (1993) 
provide evidence of short-term trading around the ex-days in the Canadian market. 
In the Asian market, short-term trading activity is shown to be prevalent in Japan 
by Kato and Loewenstein (1995). Using the traditional event study method, this 
section provides results of abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days to test the 
following hypothesis: 
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods are greater than zero. 
As shown in Table 5.5, abnormal trading volumes are statistically significant on 
most of the days around the ex-days. Only day 3 of Period 1 and days 1 and 4 of 
Period 3 have insignificant abnormal trading volumes. Consistent with the 
argument by Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), this result shows that there exist 
short-term traders buying and selling abnormally around the ex-days. However, it 
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is not clear at this stage whether abnormal volume is the result of dividend capture 
or dividend avoidance trading. In an attempt to answer this question, abnormal 
returns are examined in this study. Dividend capture is expected to result in positive 
abnormal returns before the ex-days and negative abnormal returns after the ex-
days (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer, 1995). The pattern of abnormal 
returns is expected to be reversed if dividend avoidance strategy is executed. 
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                   Table 5.5: Abnormal Trading Volumes around the Ex-dividend Days 
This table presents daily abnormal trading volume covering three sub-periods of the whole sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 
2012. The three periods are divided based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. For each period, daily abnormal 
trading volumes are calculated for a trading window of 11 days around the ex-dividend day covering five days before and five days after the 
ex-day. An ex-dividend day is eliminated from the abnormal trading volume analysis if any observation in the control period of (–45, –15) 
and (+15, +45) is missing. This leaves a data set of 1,373 observations. t-values are given in parentheses, *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
    Cum day Ex day      
–5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: Daily abnormal volume Period 1 
N=676           
0.65*** 0.41*** 0.70*** 0.73*** 0.90*** 0.50*** 0.52*** 0.35*** 0.16 0.19* 0.16 
(6.43) (4.03) (7.00) (7.25) (8.99) (5.01) (5.19) (3.52) (1.61) (1.90) (1.55) 
Panel B: Daily abnormal volume Period 2 
N=339           
0.32*** 0.29*** 0.45*** 0.46*** 0.43*** 0.26*** 0.21*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.20*** 0.16*** 
(7.19) (6.50) (10.01) (10.29) (9.59) (5.90) (4.44) (3.99) (3.82) (4.40) (3.54) 
Panel C: Daily abnormal volume Period 3 
N = 358           
0.60*** 0.55*** 0.61*** 0.59*** 1.16*** 0.39*** 0.16 0.27** 0.27** 0.03 0.32** 




5.1.2.1. Cumulative Abnormal Volumes 
 
The analysis of abnormal trading volumes in the previous section exhibits a 
significantly higher level of trading activities on most days of the cum- and ex-
dividend periods compared to these in the control period. In order to test whether 
such trading is affected by tax heterogeneity and dividend yields, the cumulative 
abnormal volumes (CAV) in three sub-periods is examined. CAV has been used as 
a tool to study the overall level of trading around the ex-days by Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1986), Michaely and Vila (1996), Graham et al. (2003) and Zhang et 
al. (2008). Figure 5.1 presents CAV for the 11-day event window period 
encompassing the ex-dividend day. The CAV for day t in the event window is the 
sum of AV occurring from day –5 leading up to day t. As predicted by the tax 
heterogeneity argument of Michaely and Vila (1995), an increase in abnormal 
volumes is expected in Period 2 and Period 3 where the difference between 
dividends and capital gains tax is widened. The following hypothesis is tested:  
H7: Abnormal volumes are higher after 1 July 2010.  
As depicted in Figure 5.1, the CAV in Period 2 and Period 3 are not greater than in 
Period 1. Despite the widest gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax 
rate in Period 2, the CAV in this period is even smaller than the CAV in Period 1 
or Period 3. Altogether, Hypothesis H7 is rejected. This result indicates that the 
level of abnormal trading is not affected by the differential tax treatment on 
dividend income and capital gains income. On the other hand, the lowest level of 
CAV in Period 2 where investors are to pay tax on both dividends and capital gains 
suggests that trading around the ex-day is significantly affected by the total tax that 
investors have to pay. The highest CAV in Period 1 together with the medium CAV 
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in Period 3 also supports this view. One possible explanation is that investors 
engaging in short-term trading in Vietnam may not be confined to those who pay 
no tax on either dividends or capital gains. This is consistent with the finding of 
Koski and Scruggs (1998) that short-term traders are not only tax-neutral 
institutions as argued by Kalay (1982) but also taxable individuals and corporations. 
When taxable individuals and corporations engage in short-term trading around the 
ex-days, a high level of tax on dividends and capital gains would discourage 



















Figure 5.1: Cumulative Abnormal Volume for Five Days around the Ex-dividend 
Days 
This figure shows the cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) of Vietnamese listed 
companies on the HOSE for the sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. 
CAV is calculated for the 11-day event window period encompassing the ex-dividend day. 
CAV for day t in the event window is the sum of AV occurring from day –5 leading up to 
day t. P1 is the graph for Period 1 from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (td=tg=0%), P2 is 
the graph for Period 2 from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (td=5%; tg=20%), P3 is the graph 







































The mean CAV in each sub-period is presented in Table 5.6. CAV is also divided 
based on the level of dividend yield. The mean CAVs are then compared among 
high, medium and low dividend yield groups to test Hypothesis H5a: Abnormal 
trading volumes are positively correlated to dividend yield. Using the full sample, 
Period 1 has the highest mean CAV at 3.120, followed by Period 3 at 2.608 and 
Period 2 at 0.991. This summary is consistent with the pattern in Figure 5.1 and is 
confirmed by the Kruskal–Wallis test that the difference in the CAV between three 
sub-samples is statistically significant ( 2 =13.78, p<0.01). Moreover, within each 
sub-period, the CAV of the high dividend yield group is always the highest and the 
most significant. For example, in Period 1, the mean CAV of stocks with high 
dividend yield is 4.518, much higher than the mean CAV of 1.397 of stocks with 
medium yield (t=4.20, p<0.001; z= 2.03, p<0.01) and the mean CAV of 1.743 of 
stocks with low dividend yield (t=3.86, p<0.001;z=1.86, p<0.05). Hypothesis H5a 
is, therefore, accepted. The finding of trading concentrated on high dividend yield 
stocks is consistent with the argument of Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) that 












                  Table 5.6: Cumulative Abnormal Volumes 
This table presents the mean cumulative abnormal volume (CAV) of the full sample and CAV in each period partitioned based on the level 
of dividend yield. Following Graham et al. (2003) and Zhang et al. (2008), dividend yield is low if it is smaller than two percent, dividend 
yield is medium if it is from two to four percent and dividend yield is high if it is greater than four percent. t-values are given in parentheses. 
The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
               Panel A:  CAV of the full sample 
Period 1 Period 2 Period 3  
CAV N CAV N CAV N 
Test of difference between 








       (2.86) 
358 2 =13.78*** 
             Panel B: CAV by dividend yield 
 Period 1 Period 2 Period 3 































Test of difference between 
Low, Medium and High DY  
2 = 17.30*** 2 = 8.10** 2 = 10.25** 
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5.1.2.2. Abnormal Volumes with State Ownership 
 
This section provides the results on abnormal trading volumes around the ex-days 
based on the level of state ownership. Throughout the three periods, the level of 
abnormal trading for stocks with high state ownership is less significant compared 
to stocks with medium and low state ownership. While abnormal volumes of stocks 
with medium and low state ownership are positive and significant on most days 
around the ex-days, abnormal volumes of stocks with high state ownership are only 
significant for day –4 and 0 in Period 1; day –5, –2, –1 and 0 in Period 2 and day –
4, –3 and –1 in Period 3. Furthermore, trading on stocks with high state ownership 
occurs mainly before the ex-days. There are different explanations for this trading 
pattern of stocks with high state ownership. First, traders in stocks with high state 
ownership tend to be long-term investors with their decisions focused on timing of 
the trade, that is, whether to trade before or on the ex-dividend days. Green (1980) 
argues that delaying a transaction might be more costly than speeding up a 
transaction. It follows that investors who have decided to buy or sell would do so 
before the ex-days, thereby creating a significant increase in trading volumes before 
the ex-days. Second, the abnormal trading activity before the ex-day can also be 
triggered by short-term traders who wish to conduct round-trip trades. However, 
after the ex-days, if their increased orders to trade are not matched by the market, 
the level of transaction in the market would still be at the “normal” level. To identify 
whether the observed abnormal volumes of stocks with high state ownership before 
the ex-days are caused by short-term or long-term traders, the current study 
investigates the relation between trading volumes and transaction costs. Long-term 
investors consider transaction costs as fixed and are indifferent between various 
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transaction cost levels (Elton and Gruber, 1970) while short-term traders are much 
more sensitive to transaction cost changes (Kalay, 1982). The analogous analysis 
can be performed on stocks with medium and low level of state ownership to reveal 




                  Table 5.7: Abnormal Trading Volumes by State Ownership 
The table below presents daily abnormal trading volume covering three periods of the whole sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 
2012. The three periods are divided based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. Abnormal volumes in each 
period are further partitioned based on the level of state ownership. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei et al. (2003), state ownership 
(SO) is high, medium and low if the State holds more than 50 percent, from 20 to 50 percent and smaller than 20 percent of the total number 
of shares in the company respectively. Daily abnormal trading volumes are calculated for a trading window of 11 days around the ex-dividend 
day covering five days before and five days after the ex-day. An ex-dividend day is eliminated from the abnormal trading volume analysis if 
any observation in the control period of (–45, –15) and (+15, +45) is missing. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 
percent level respectively.  











     Cum day Ex day      
 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 

















































































                Table 5.7 - Continued 
 
     Cum day Ex day      
 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 




















































































































































                
5.1.3. Abnormal Returns  
 
The analysis of abnormal returns around the ex-days was first used by Lakonishok 
and Vermaelen (1986) to identify the preference of investors toward dividends. It 
was then followed by Lasfer (1995) and Graham et al. (2003). Table 5.8 provides 
results on excess returns around the ex-days for the three sub-periods to test 
Hypothesis H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the ex-days and negative on 
and after the ex-days. On day –5 and –4 in Period 1, day –1 in Period 2 and day –5 
and –2 in Period 3, the excess returns are significantly positive. On certain days in 
each period such as day –2 in Period 1 and day –3 in Period 2, excess returns are 
negative but not statistically significant. From the ex-day onward, excess returns 
are consistently negative and significant. Altogether, Hypothesis H6 is accepted. 
According to Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), the positive excess return before 
the ex-days is an indicator of increased buying pressure created by investors seeking 
to capture dividends. If this is the case, the desire of these investors to sell during 
the ex-dividend period (i.e. increased selling pressure) would be reflected through 
negative excess returns. Results in the previous section shows that there exist some 
differences in the abnormal trading volumes among stocks at varying levels of state 
ownership. Therefore, it would be worth examining the abnormal returns based on 
state ownership to better understand the trading behaviour around the ex-days of 
investors in the Vietnamese market. 
Table 5.9 presents abnormal returns in each period based on three levels of state 
ownership. Throughout the three sub-periods, the mean abnormal returns of stocks 
with a high level of state ownership are not significant for all days around the ex-
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day and on the ex-day itself. This result, together with the insignificant trading 
volumes, suggests that stocks with high state ownership are not the target of short-
term traders on the HOSE. On the other hand, stocks at a lower level of state 
ownership exhibit the pattern of abnormal returns that is consistent with the short-
term trading hypothesis. Similar to the results found on the full sample in each 
period, abnormal returns from stocks with low and medium level of state ownership 
are positive before the ex-days and negative on and after the day that stocks go ex-
dividend. This result is consistent with investors in the Vietnamese market 
attempting to capture dividends by buying before the ex-days and selling once the 
stocks go ex-dividend. Furthermore, the behaviour of abnormal returns consistent 
with dividend capture is most evident in stocks with medium and low level of state 
ownership. In literature, dividend capture has also been found to be present in 
markets such as the NASDAQ (Karpoff and Walkling, 1998) and the Canadian 
market (Athanassakos and Fowler, 1993).  
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                    Table 5.8: Abnormal Returns around the Ex-dividend Days 
This table presents abnormal returns for the sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. The three sub-periods are divided 
based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. Daily abnormal returns are provided for 11 days covering five days 
before and after the ex-dividend dates. Abnormal returns are calculated as (RETi,t – rf,t) – (α + β(rm,t – rf,t)) where α and β are estimated from 
a market model from day 45 to day 15 before the ex-day and from day 15 to day 45 after the ex-day, rf is the one-year interest rate on 
Vietnamese government notes and rm is the daily return of VNINDEX. t-values are given in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
 
    Cum day Ex day      
–5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: Daily abnormal volume Period 1 
N=695           
0.0102*** 0.0070* 0.0031 –0.0014 0.0102 –0.0100*** –0.0080*** –0.0063*** –0.0151*** –0.0135*** –0.0054*** 
(3.13) (1.89) (0.72) (–0.23) (1.53) (–4.80) (–4.89) (–3.56) (–3.35) (–2.58) (–3.63) 
Panel B: Daily abnormal volume Period 2 
N=349           
0.0008 0.0022 –0.0002 0.0012 0.0059** –0.0006 –0.0061** –0.0025* –0.0040*** –0.0024 –0.0036** 
(0.58) (1.61) (–1.23) (0.81) (2.36) (–0.41) (–2.24) (–1.71) (–2.75) (–1.64) (–2.34) 
Panel C: Daily abnormal volume Period 3 
N = 369           
0.0045*** –0.0008 –5.2E-05 0.00347** –6.6E-05 –0.0064*** –0.0043*** –0.0020 –0.0034** –0.0005 –0.0052*** 






          Table 5.9: Abnormal Returns by State Ownership 
This table presents daily abnormal returns for three sub-periods divided based on different levels of dividends tax rate and capital gains tax 
rate. Abnormal returns in each period are further partitioned based on the level of state ownership. Following La Porta et al. (1999) and Wei 
et al. (2003), state ownership (SO) is high, medium and low if the State holds more than 50 percent, from 20 to 50 percent and smaller than 
20 percent of the total number of shares in the company. t-values are given in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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       Table 5.9 - Continued 
         
          
     Cum day Ex day      
 –5 –4 –3 –2 –1 0 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel B: Daily abnormal returns Period 2 (N=349) 
















































































































































5.2. Regression Analysis 
 
5.2.1. Regression Analysis on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios 
 
Panel A of Table 5.10 reports the results of regression analysis on drop-off ratios. 
Using the full sample from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012, three estimation 
techniques, OLS, robust and panel methods, are employed. There is no significant 
deviation in the results of the three methods. The insignificant estimates of the two 
dummy variables demonstrate that the drop-off ratios do not change significantly 
over the three sub-periods. This result is consistent with what has been found in the 
mean drop-off ratios of the three sub-periods using univariate analysis. On the other 
hand, the positive and significant estimate of 
2  shows that drop-off ratio is higher 
for stocks with higher state ownership. And since a higher drop-off ratio exhibits a 
higher market value of dividends, this result from regression analysis indicates that 
the market value of dividends in the Vietnamese market is not significantly affected 
by the relative difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate but 
by the level of state ownership in the firm. Therefore, Hypothesis H8: There is a 
relationship between state ownership and the market value of dividends is accepted.  
Panel B of Table 5.10 shows regression results on observations with high state 
ownership. The estimates of the two dummy variables are consistently positive and 
significant using all three estimation methods, indicating that the market value of 
dividends of stocks with high state ownership is significantly higher when 
dividends are more tax advantaged relative to capital gains. This result is consistent 
with the findings from univariate analysis that drop-off ratios of stocks with high 
state ownership are not statistically different from one in Period 1 but are 
significantly greater than one in both Period 2 and Period 3. Panel C and Panel D 
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of Table 5.10 present regression estimates on observations with medium and low 
state ownership respectively and the overall results are not supportive of the 
argument by Elton and Gruber (1970) since most of the estimates of the dummy 
variables for Period 2 and Period 3 are not significantly positive. The only result 
that is consistent with the tax hypothesis is the estimate of the dummy variable for 
Period 3 using panel regression presented in Panel C of Table 5.10. The estimate of 
4 is 1.322 and is statistically significant at the one percent level, showing that the 
market value of dividends of stocks with medium state ownership is significantly 
higher in Period 3 than in Period 1. Overall, the impact of taxes on the market value 
of dividends is significant for stocks with high state ownership, but not for stocks 




         
 
                    Table 5.10: Regression Analysis on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios 
This table reports estimates of the regression on drop-off ratios (DR) for the full sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. 
The dependent variable DR is calculated as the ratio of stock price decrease on the ex-day (Pcum-Pex) to dividend (D). The control variables 
are (1) Log (Market-Capi,t) calculated as the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation of stock i on the ex-day t, (2) DYi,t (Dividend Yield) 
calculated as Dividend Per Share divided by stock price on the cum-day, (3) State ownership is state share ownership as of the ex-dividend 
day, (4) Dummy if period 2 which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero 
otherwise, (5) Dummy if period 3 which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1 August 2011 and zero otherwise. The 
regression is estimated using OLS, robust and panel method. Only 1,398 out of 1,413 observations of the data set on abnormal returns are 
included in the panel regression since 24 stocks offer only one observation over the sample period and therefore are eliminated. The reported 
estimates for OLS method are adjusted using Newey-West correction to account for heteroskedasticy and autocorrelation in the residuals. 
The regression estimates for the full sample, for observations with high and low state ownership using panel regression are from the fixed 
effects model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect is rejected at the 5 percent level. The regression 
estimates for observation with medium state ownership using panel regression are from the random effects model since the Hausman test 
proves that the null hypothesis of random effect cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The t-statistic for OLS and panel method and the 
Chi-square statistic for robust method are provided in parentheses.  
The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.  
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Method DR   0  1  2  3  4  R
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                           Table 5.10 - Continued 
Method DR   0  1  2  3  4  R
2 Obs 
























































































5.2.2. Regression Analysis on Ex-day Abnormal Returns 
 
Ex-day abnormal returns are used in conjunction with drop-off ratios as a dependent 
variable in regression analysis since drop-off ratios might suffer from 
heteroskedasticity problems (Eades et al., 1984). Ex-day abnormal returns indicate 
the market value of dividends in the opposite way that ex-day drop-off ratios do. A 
higher market value of dividends is associated with a higher drop-off ratio but with 
a lower ex-day abnormal return. Panel A of Table 5.11 reports regression estimates 
on the ex-day abnormal returns for the full sample. The negative and significant 
estimate of the variable State across the three regression methods is consistent with 
the previous finding that the market value of dividends is higher for stocks with 
higher state ownership. Therefore, Hypothesis H8: There is a relationship between 
state ownership and the market value of dividends is accepted. The insignificant 
estimates of the two dummy variables using OLS and panel methods are also 
consistent with these from regressions which used the ex-day drop-off ratios in the 
previous section. The only result that supports the tax hypothesis is the estimate of 
the dummy variable for Period 3 from robust regression. The estimate of 
4 is 
negative and significant with a value of –0.0085. Elton and Gruber (1970) argue 
that when dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains, the market value 
of dividends should increase when the gap between dividends tax rate and capital 
gains tax rate is reduced. When dividends are taxed at a lower rate than capital 
gains, the case should be reversed and the market value of dividends should increase 
when the difference between the two tax rates are widened. In Vietnam, in Period 
1, there was no tax on either dividends or capital gains. In Period 3, dividends were 
subject to no tax and capital gains were taxed at 10 percent. Moreover, a lower ex-
86 
 
day abnormal return indicates a higher market value of dividends; therefore, the 
negative and significant estimate of 
4  from robust regression shows that market 
value of dividends is higher in Period 3 than in Period 1. Nonetheless, Period 2 
experienced a wider gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rates but 
the estimate of 
3  from robust regression is neither negative nor significant. 
Overall, the results suggest that the market value of dividends is not responsive to 
a change in relevant tax regime; therefore, the tax hypothesis appears to receive 
little support in the Vietnamese market.  
Panel B of Table 5.11 presents regression results on observations with high state 
ownership. Results from univariate analysis show that drop-off ratios of stocks with 
high state ownership are not statistically different from one in Period 1. Moreover, 
drop-off ratios are greater than one in both Period 2 and Period 3. The inference of 
these results is that the market value of dividends paid from stocks with high state 
ownership is higher when dividends are taxed at a lower rate than capital gains 
compared to when dividends and capital gains are equally taxed. Regression 
estimates for observations with high state ownership also confirm this pattern. The 
coefficients on the two dummy variables representing Period 2 and Period 3 are 
significantly negative. Regressions are also performed on observations with 
medium and low state ownership. However, Panel C and Panel D of Table 5.11 
show that the results do not support the tax hypothesis. The coefficients on dummy 






 Table 5.11: Regression Analysis on Ex-day Abnormal Returns 
This table reports estimates of the regression on ex-day abnormal returns for the full sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 
2012. The dependent variable abnormal return is calculated as the daily return of the stock on the ex-dividend day t minus its expected return 
estimated by CAPM. The control variables are (1) Log (Market-Capi,t) calculated as the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation of stock 
i on the ex-day t, (2) DYi,t (Dividend Yield) calculated as Dividend Per Share divided by stock price on the cum-day, (3) State ownership 
is state share ownership as of the ex-dividend day, (4) Dummy if period 2 which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made between 
1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero otherwise, (5) Dummy if period 3 which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1 
August 2011 and zero otherwise. The regression is estimated using OLS, robust and panel method. Only 1,389 out of 1,413 observations of 
the data set on abnormal returns are included in the panel regression since 24 stocks offer only one observation over the sample period and 
therefore are eliminated. The reported estimates for OLS method are adjusted using Newey-West correction to account for heteroskedasticy 
and autocorrelation in the residuals. The regression estimates for the full sample, for observations with medium and low state ownership 
using panel regression are from the fixed effects model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect is rejected at 
the 5 percent level. The regression estimates for observation with high state ownership using panel regression are from the random effects 
model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The t-statistic for 
OLS and panel method and the Chi-square statistic for robust method are provided in parentheses. 
The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.  
 
ABRETi,t = α + β0Log (Market-Capi,t) + β1DYi,t + β2State Ownershipi,t + β3Dummyif period 2 + β4 Dummy if period 3 + ε. 
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5.2.3. Regression Analysis on Abnormal Volumes 
 
Following Michaely and Vila (1995), the cumulative abnormal volumes are used in 
regression analysis to examine how abnormal trading volumes are correlated to 
transaction costs and dividend yields (Testing of Hypothesis H5a and H5b). 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986) argue that short-term trading is concentrated on 
high-yielding stocks and abnormal trading volumes are more pronounced when 
transaction cost is low. Panel A of Table 5.12 presents the regression estimates for 
the full sample. The results are consistent with the prediction of Lakonishok and 
Vermaelen (1986) with significantly positive coefficients on the variable DY and 
significantly negative coefficients on the variable 1/Pcum. These results confirm that 
investors trading around the ex-days in the Vietnamese market are far more 
attracted to high-yielding stocks than to lower yielding stock and they trade more 
when transaction costs are less, leading to the acceptance of Hypothesis H5a: 
Abnormal trading volumes are positively correlated to dividend yield and 
Hypothesis H5b: Abnormal trading volumes are negatively correlated to 
transaction costs. The negative and significant coefficient on the dummy variable 
indicating Period 2 shows that abnormal trading volumes in Period 2 are 
significantly less than in Period 1. On the other hand, the coefficient on the dummy 
variable indicating Period 3 is negative but insignificant using OLS. The robust 
method shows that abnormal trading volumes in Period 3 are not significantly 
smaller than in Period 1. These results are consistent with the pattern observed in 
Figure 5.1 and lead to the rejection of Hypothesis H7: Abnormal trading volumes 
are higher after 1 July 2010. 
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Regression analysis on the cumulative abnormal volumes is also performed within 
different levels of state ownership. Panels B, C and D of Table 5.12 report 
regression estimates for observations with high, medium and low state ownership 
respectively. While Panels C and D show a significantly negative coefficient on the 
variable 1/Pcum, Panel B finds the coefficient on 1/Pcum to be insignificant.
21 The 
coefficient on the variable DY is positive and significant in all three cases. The 
results suggest that regardless of the level of state ownership, trading around the ex-
days is more pronounced for higher yielding stocks, but for stocks with high state 
ownership, trading is unaffected by transaction costs, while for stocks with medium 
and low state ownership, higher transaction costs appear to significantly inhibit the 
level of trading. 
 
                                                          







 Table 5.12: Regression Analysis on Abnormal Volumes 
This table reports estimates of the regression on cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) for the full sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 
December 2012. The dependent variable cumulative abnormal volume of stock i for the ex-day event t is calculated as the mean CAV for the 
11-day period encompassing the ex-day of this stock. Following Michaely and Vila (1996), the control variables are (1) Log (Market-Capi,t) 
calculated as the natural logarithm of Market Capitalisation of stock i on the ex-day t, (2) DYi,t (Dividend Yield) calculated as Dividend Per 
Share divided by stock price on the cum-day, (3) State ownership is state share ownership as of the ex-dividend day, (4) Dummy if period 2 
which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made between 1 July 2010 and 31 July 2011 and zero otherwise, (5) Dummy if period 3 
which takes the value of one if the dividend payment is made after 1 August 2011 and zero otherwise. The regression is estimated using 
OLS, robust and panel method. Only 1,353 out of 1,373 observations of the data set on cumulative abnormal volumes are included in the 
panel regression since 20 stocks offer only one observation over the sample period and therefore are eliminated. The reported estimates for 
OLS method are adjusted using Newey-West correction to account for heteroskedasticy and autocorrelation in the residuals. The regression 
estimates for the full sample, for observations with high and medium state ownership using panel regression are from the random effects 
model since the Hausman test proves that the null hypothesis of random effect cannot be rejected at the 5 percent level. The regression 
estimates for observation with low state ownership using panel regression are from the fixed effects model since the Hausman test proves 
that the null hypothesis of random effect is rejected at the 5 percent level. The t-statistic for OLS and panel method and the Chi-square 
statistic for robust method are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. 
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Method CAV   0  1  2  3  4  5  6  R
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5.3. Robustness Tests 
 
In this section, several tests are performed to verify the robustness of the thesis’s 
main findings. The primary purpose of a robustness test is to examine how core 
regression estimates behave under model uncertainty (Lu and White, 2014). 
According to Plumper and Neumayer (2012), some of the most common robustness 
tests are the use of additional variables, alternative measures of dependent or 
independent variables and changes in the sample. In this study, first, an examination 
is conducted to determine whether the results are sensitive to endogeneity 
associated with the variable state ownership. In addition, to confirm whether the 
results on how dividend value is affected are influenced by sample selection, the 
sample is divided based on state ownership into above-median state ownership sub-
sample and below-median state ownership sub-sample to check how the regression 
results on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns might be affected. 
5.3.1. Endogeneity 
 
Eom et al. (2007) argue that in event studies, critical variables might be 
endogenously determined. In those cases, the use of panel-data analysis helps to 
control for endogenous variables. According to Mundlak (1978), endogeneity exists 
in fixed effects panel-data model but not in random effects model. Baltagi et al. 
(2003) further argue that if the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis of zero 
conditional mean of errors, regression estimates should be from the fixed effects 
model. This is also consistent with the argument by Eom et al. (2007) that if the 
Hausman test does not reject the random effect, then endogeneity does not exist. 
On the other hand, if the Hausman test rejects random effects specification, 
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endogeneity is an issue and estimators from the fixed effects model will be robust 
to endogeneity. Therefore, the use of panel-data regressions on drop-off ratios, 
abnormal returns and abnormal volumes with the support of the Hausman test in 
previous sections already accounts for endogeneity problems. And since the results 
from panel-data regressions are not significantly different from OLS regression, our 
results appear to be robust to endogeneity. 
The robustness of the results subject to the endogenous variable state ownership 
can also be examined using instrumental variable in two-stage least squares 
regressions (Cornett et al., 2009). Dinc (2005) argues that the lagged variables are 
uncorrelated with the error terms in the current regression. Therefore, following 
Cornett et al. (2009), in the first stage, state ownership is regressed using 3-year 
lagged state ownership, the company’s size, dividend yield and payout ratio. The 
second stage uses the fitted values of state ownership from the first stage as an 
instrumental variable to regress on ex-day drop-off ratios, abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal volumes. Finally, the Hausman test is performed to identify 
whether there exists significant difference between the coefficients of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and two-stage least squares (2SLS). The Hausman tests prove that 
there is no significant difference between OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates for 
the regressions on ex-day drop-off ratios, abnormal returns and cumulative 
abnormal volumes, indicating that theresults are not sensitive to the possible 
endogeneity associated with the variable state ownership.
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Table 5.13: Two-stage Least Squares Regression on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios and Ex-day Abnormal Returns 
This table reports estimates of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression on ex-day drop-off ratio and ex-day abnormal returns for the full 
sample period from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. In the first stage, state ownership is regressed using 3-year lagged state ownership, the 
company’s size, Dividend Yield and payout ratio. The second stage uses the fitted values of state ownership from the first stage as an instrumental 
variable to regress on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote 
significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. The Hausman test is used to test the difference between OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates. 































R2 15.47% 11.78% 
Hausman test:  
H0: There is no significant difference 
between OLS and 2SLS estimates 
 
2 = 3.16 
 
2 = 1.07 
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Table 5.14: Two-stage Least Squares Regression on Abnormal Volumes 
This table reports estimates of the two-stage least squares (2SLS) regression on cumulative abnormal volumes (CAV) for the full sample period 
from 1 January 2006 to 31 December 2012. In the first stage, state ownership is regressed using 3-year lagged state ownership, the company’s size, 
Dividend Yield and payout ratio. The second stage uses the fitted values of state ownership from the first stage as an instrumental variable to regress 
on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 
10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively. The Hausman test is used to test the difference between OLS estimates and 2SLS estimates. 
 



















Dummyif period 2 
–1.795* 
(–1.89) 









5.3.2. Sub-sample Division 
 
In this section, to confirm whether the  regression results on ex-day drop-off ratios 
and ex-day abnormal returns are influenced by sample selection, the sample is 
divided based on the median value of state ownership into above-median state 
ownership sub-sample and below-median state ownership sub-sample and 
regressions are re-run accordingly. Results from Table 5.15 show that for an 
increase in state ownership, drop-off ratio increases while ex-day abnormal return 
decreases. This result is significant and consistent for both sub-samples, indicating 
that the positive effect of state ownership on the market value of dividends is not 
sensitive to sample selection. Moreover, the insignificant estimates on the two 
dummy variables are also consistent with the regression results for the full sample, 
implying that the market value of dividends is not affected by the change in the 
relative difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. Altogether, 
the results on how dividends value is affected by taxes and state ownership are 
robust to sample selection bias.  
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Table 5.15: Sub-sample Regressions on Ex-day Drop-off Ratios and Ex-day Abnormal Returns 
This table reports estimates of regression on ex-day drop-off ratios and ex-day abnormal returns of the two sub-samples divided based on the median 
value of state ownership of 0.3471. The sample is divided into sub-sample with above-median state ownership and sub-sample with below-median 
state ownership. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The asterisks *, **, *** denote significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level respectively.  
 Dependent Variable: DR Dependent Variable: ABRET 
 Sub-sample with above-median 
state ownership 
Sub-sample with below-median 
state ownership 
Sub-sample with above-median 
state ownership 
























































R2 14.49% 2.92% 17.91% 7.62% 
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5.4. Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
5.4.1. Results of Hypothesis Testing 
 
The study examines the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of 
dividends by testing several hypotheses. The acceptance or rejection of these 
hypotheses contributes to examine and explain how the market value of dividends 
is affected by the difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate 
and by the level of state ownership. Based on the results from both univariate and 
multivariate analyses in previous sections, Table 5.13 provides a summary of 

























5.4.2. The Impact of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends 
 
The study finds evidence consistent with the tax-based explanation of the ex-day 
price behaviour in the Vietnamese market during the period of no tax on either 
dividends or capital gains. In that period, the ex-day stock price drop is found to be 
not significantly different from one. Nonetheless, the study does not find the 
Subjects tested Hypothesis Result 
The impact of the differential 
tax treatment between dividends 
and capital gains on the market 
value of dividends 
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 
2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are 
not different from one. 
Accept 
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 
to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are 
greater than one. 
Reject 
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 
2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period 
3) are greater than one. 
Reject 
The presence of short-term 
trading  
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three 
sub-periods are greater than zero. 
Accept 
H5a: Abnormal trading volumes are 
positively correlated to dividend 
yield 
H5b: Abnormal trading volumes are 




H6: Abnormal returns are positive 
before the ex-days and negative on 
and after the ex-days. 
Accept 
The impact of the differential 
tax treatment between dividends 
and capital gains on short-term 
trading 
H7: Abnormal trading volumes are 
higher after 1 July 2010. 
Reject 
The impact of state ownership 
on the market value of 
dividends 
H8: There is a relationship between 





difference between the tax rates on dividends and on capital gains to significantly 
affect the market value of dividends of stocks as tested using measures of both the 
ex-day drop-off ratios and the ex-day abnormal returns. The main findings are as 
follows. First, during the period where dividends are tax advantaged relative to 
capital gains, drop-off ratios are not found to be greater than one (rejection of H2 
and H3). Moreover, regression estimates confirm that even though tax rates on 
dividends and capital gains vary over the three periods, the ex-day drop-off ratios 
and the ex-day abnormal returns do not significantly respond to tax changes. 
Altogether, this study does not lend full support to the tax hypothesis. One possible 
explanation as to why the gap between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate 
does not significantly affect the market value of dividends on the HOSE is the 
presence of short-term trading around the ex-days. The simultaneous acceptance of 
Hypotheses H4, H5 and H6 and the rejection of Hypothesis H7 is consistent with 
the notion of short-term traders trading abnormally around the ex-days. This is 
further supported by evidence of the ex-day behaviour significantly affected by 
transaction costs and dividend yields but unaffected by the differential tax treatment 
between dividends and capital gains. 
5.4.3. The Impact of State Ownership on the Market Value of Dividends 
 
Results from univariate analysis and regression analysis both accept Hypothesis H8 
that there is a relationship between state ownership and the market value of 
dividends. Drop-off ratios are higher for stocks with higher state ownership. On the 
other hand, the ex-day abnormal returns are lower when state ownership is higher. 
Both indicate that the market value of dividends is positively correlated with the 
level of shares held by the State.  
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5.4.4. Ownership Structure as a Moderating Factor in Explaining the Impact 
of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends 
 
State ownership is shown to not only significantly affect the market value of 
dividends but also act as a moderating factor in explaining how dividends are valued 
against capital gains using the tax hypothesis. When the sample is divided based on 
high, medium and low state ownership and compare drop-off ratios accordingly, 
Hypotheses H1, H2 and H3 are accepted within the sub-sample of high state 
ownership, but not within the sub-sample of medium or low state ownership. This 
result indicates that, in the Vietnamese market, the difference between the tax rates 
on dividends and on capital gains only affects the market value of dividends of 
stocks with a high level of state ownership. Further analysis on abnormal volumes 
and abnormal return provides an explanation to this phenomenon. The insignificant 
abnormal trading volumes and abnormal returns on most of the days around the ex-
days of stocks with high state ownership suggest that investors holding high-state-
owned stocks do not trade abnormally around the ex-days. Moreover, trading in 
stocks with high state ownership is found not to be significantly driven by 
transaction costs. For stocks with medium and low state ownership, the study 
provides evidence consistent with the presence of dividend capture around the ex-
days. Evidence of significant abnormal volumes combined with positive abnormal 
returns before and negative abnormal returns after the ex-days supports the short-
term trading hypothesis. More importantly, the trading around the ex-days in stocks 
with medium and low state ownership is significantly influenced by the level of 
transaction costs.  
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This study presents evidence consistent with insights provided by Elton and Gruber 
(1970). Viewing investors who trade in stocks with high state ownership as long-
term investors, they would tend to consider transaction costs as fixed and therefore 
less important. It follows that under the presence of long-term investors, the ex-day 
price and the market value of dividends are more likely to be affected by the 
difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate. On the other hand, 
when state ownership is relatively lower, the impact of the difference between 
dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate on the value of dividends is more likely 
to be lessened if short-term traders are dominant around the ex-days. The results 


















6.1. Main Contents of the Thesis 
 
This thesis investigates how the market value of dividends in the Vietnamese 
market is affected by taxes and state ownership for the period 2006–2012. The 
market value of dividends is examined through the ex-day drop-off ratios of the 
stocks with a higher drop-off ratio indicating a higher market value of dividends. 
The impact of taxes on the market value of dividends is examined based on how the 
ex-day drop-off ratios change following a change in the relative difference between 
the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains. The comparison of the ex-day drop-
off ratios at different levels of state ownership is employed to evaluate how state 
ownership affects the market value of dividends. In addition to the Introduction 
and Conclusion Chapter, the thesis comprises of four main chapters of which 
contents are summarized as follows. 
Chapter two: Literature Review presents a theoretical framework where the 
concept of dividend value is derived. The chapter starts with the dividend 
irrelevance theory by Miller and Modigliani (1961) which proposes that dividend 
policy does not affect the firm’s value assuming that there are no market frictions 
such as taxes, transaction costs, information asymmetry, and agency costs. 
Dividend irrelevance theory supports the notion that dividend policies do not affect 
dividend value therefore stock prices on the ex-dividend day should drop by 
approximately the amount of dividends (Campbell and Beraneck, 1955). The two 
competing theories challenge the dividend irrelevance theory and propose that 
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dividend policy does affect the firm’s value. The bird-in-the-hand hypothesis argues 
that investors prefer sure dividends to fluctuating capital gains. In contrast, the tax 
preference theory argues that capital gains are preferred to dividends due to 
dividends being taxed at a higher rate than capital gains.  
Chapter two also discusses relevant studies on factors that might affect the market 
value of dividends. First, Elton and Gruber (1970) propose the tax hypothesis which 
argues that the higher tax rate on dividends than on capital gains causes dividends 
to be discounted in value against capital gains. Evidence in support of the tax 
hypothesis includes an equal-to-one drop-off ratio when dividends and capital gains 
are equally taxed (Barclay, 1987; Milonas et al., 2006); a lower-than-one drop-off 
ratio when dividends are more heavily taxed than capital gains (Bell and Jenkinson, 
2002; Elton and Gruber, 1970; Lasfer and Zenonos, 2003); a higher-than-one drop-
off ratio when dividends are tax advantaged compared to capital gains (Elton et al., 
2005; Green and Rydqvist, 1999) and an increase in drop-off ratio when the gap 
between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate is reduced (Lasfer, 1995; 
Francis et al., 2012). Second, Kalay (1982) argues that the manner in which 
dividends are valued against capital gains depends on the level of transaction costs 
incurred by short-term investors around the ex-days. Lakonishok and Vermaelen 
(1986), Karpoff and Walkling (1990) and Athanassakos (1996) provide evidence to 
support Kalay’s view when they find significant abnormal trading volumes around 
the ex-days with positive abnormal returns before and negative abnormal returns 
after the ex-days. Third, Michaely and Vila (1995) propose that the level of tax 
heterogeneity among investors is an important determinant of the ex-day trading 
pattern and the market value of dividends. Finally, market microstructure 
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explanations interpret the ex-day price behaviour based on price discreteness, bid-
ask bounce and limit order adjustments. The key argument by supporters of the 
market microstructure explanations is that even in the absence of taxes and 
transaction costs, stock price on the ex-days is unlikely to fall by the exact amount 
of dividend due to market microstructure factors such as price discreteness, bid-ask 
bounce and limit order adjustments. 
Chapter three: Institutional Settings of the Vietnamese Market provides 
institutional conditions of the Vietnamese market. The tax mechanism in Vietnam 
is featured by flat tax rates on both dividends and capital gains. On the other hand, 
the tax rates have never been higher on dividends than on capital gains. This chapter 
also discusses the equitisation process in Vietnam since many of the companies on 
the HOSE which is the focus of this study are former SOEs and are equitised 
through the equitisation process.  
Chapter four: Hypotheses, Data and Methods discusses data, methods and 
hypotheses of the study. The sample used includes 265 dividend paying firms on 
the Ho Chi Minh Stock Exchange during the period from 1 January 2006 to 31 
December 2012. A total of eight hypotheses are proposed to examine the impact of 
taxes and state ownership on the market value of dividends. In testing these 
hypotheses, both univariate and regression techniques are employed. 
Chapter five: Empirical Findings presents the empirical results on drop-off ratios, 
abnormal volumes and abnormal returns to assist the hypothesis testing procedure 
using both univariate and regression analysis. Chapter five also concludes about the 
impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of dividends in the 
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Vietnamese market and how state ownership can act as a moderating factor in 
explaining the ex-day stock price behaviour from a tax-based perspective. 
6.2. Summary of Empirical Findings 
 
6.2.1. The Impact of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends 
 
By testing different hypotheses on how the ex-day drop-off ratios change following 
the variations on dividends and capital gains tax rate, the study finds that the ex-
day drop-off ratios, therefore the value of dividends, do not significantly increase 
when dividends become more tax advantaged compared to capital gains. 
Hypothesis H1 is not rejected, meaning that the ex-day drop-off ratios are not 
statistically different from one when there was no tax on either dividends or on 
capital gains which is consistent with the tax-based explanation of the ex-day price 
behaviour; however, both Hypothesis H2 and H3 that the ex-day drop-off ratios are 
greater than one when dividends were taxed at a lower rate than capital gains are 
rejected. Altogether, this study does not lend full support to the tax hypothesis.  
H1: Drop-off ratios from 1 January 2006 to 30 June 2010 (Period 1) are not 
different from one. 
H2: Drop-off ratios from 1 July 2010 to 31 July 2011 (Period 2) are greater than 
one. 
H3: Drop-off ratios from 1 August 2011 to 31 December 2012 (Period 3) are 
greater than one. 
The results from regression analysis show that the ex-day drop-off ratios and the 
ex-day abnormal returns in Period 2 and Period 3 where dividends were taxed at a 
lower rate than capital gains are not statistically different from the corresponding 
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values obtained from Period 1 where dividends and capital gains were equally 
taxed. These results, together with the rejection of Hypothesis H2 and H3, suggest 
that the relative difference between the tax rate on dividends and on capital gains 
does not significantly affect the market value of dividends. This is consistent with 
some previous studies that find dividends and capital gains tax rate to be 
uncorrelated with the ex-day drop-off ratios. For example, Michaely (1991) finds 
no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios in the US market when the differential tax 
treatment between dividends and capital gains was removed. In a similar manner, 
Daunfeldt (2002) provides evidence against the tax hypothesis in Sweden when he 
reports no change in the ex-day drop-off ratios following substantial changes in the 
tax policy. 
This study also examines trading volumes to detect the presence of short-term 
trading in the Vietnamese market and accepts the following hypotheses: 
H4: Abnormal volumes in all three sub-periods are greater than zero. 
H5a: Abnormal trading volumes are positively correlated to dividend yield. 
H5b: Abnormal trading volumes are negatively correlated to transaction costs. 
H6: Abnormal returns are positive before the ex-days and negative on and after the 
ex-days. 
The simultaneous acceptance of Hypotheses H4, H5a, H5b and H6 supports that 
short-term traders are active around the ex-days. Consistent with the arguments by 
Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1986), short-term trading on the HOSE is concentrated 
on high-yielding stocks and abnormal trading volumes are more pronounced when 
transaction cost is low. Furthermore, abnormal return is found to be consistently 
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positive before the ex-days and negative on and after the ex-days, suggesting that 
investors are executing dividend capture (Lakonishok and Vermaelen, 1986; Lasfer, 
1995). In literature, dividend capture has also been found to be present in markets 
such as the NASDAQ (Karpoff and Walkling, 1998) and the Canadian market 
(Athanassakos and Fowler, 1993). Altogether, the ex-day behaviour in the 
Vietnamese market is significantly affected by transaction costs and dividend yields 
but unaffected by the differential tax treatment between dividends and capital gains. 
The study also shows that the tax heterogeneity does not significantly affect the 
short-term trading activities of investors in the Vietnamese market and rejects the 
following hypothesis H7. According to Michaely and Vila (1995), if tax is taken 
into consideration by short-term traders on the HOSE, the case of dividends tax-
advantaged relative to capital gains would lead to an increased level of abnormal 
trading volumes compared to the case when dividends and capital gains are equally 
taxed. This prediction was not supported in this study. 
H7: Abnormal trading volumes are higher after 1 July 2010. 
6.2.2. The Impact of State Ownership on the Market Value of Dividends 
 
In this study, state ownership is found to significantly affect the market value of 
dividends. Dividends paid from companies with a higher state ownership are more 
valuable than dividends from companies with a lower state ownership. The study 
accepts the following hypothesis: 




The finding of state ownership significantly affecting the market value of dividends 
adds to existing factors that might explain how dividends are valued. M&M (1961) 
argue that dividend clienteles are formed by investors’ ages and that the dividend 
value of low-yield stocks is higher for young investors. Frank and Jagannathan 
(1998) attribute the nuisance of handling with dividends as what makes dividends 
less valuable for investors. On the other hand, Thaler and Shefrin (1981) propose 
that self-control drives investors to prefer cash dividends rather than income from 
capital gains.  
6.2.3. Ownership Structure as a Moderating Factor in Explaining the Impact 
of Taxes on the Market Value of Dividends 
 
In examining the impact of taxes and state ownership on the market value of 
dividends, the study also finds that ownership structure can act as a moderating 
factor in explaining the impact of taxes. The key finding is that the differential tax 
treatment between dividends and capital gains has an effect on the dividend value 
of stocks with a high level of state ownership. This was not the case for stocks with 
medium or low state ownership. Nonetheless, this presents evidence consistent with 
insights provided by Elton and Gruber (1970). Viewing investors who trade in 
stocks with high state ownership as long-term investors would tend to consider 
transaction costs as fixed and therefore less important. It follows that under the 
presence of long-term investors, the ex-day price and the market value of dividends 
are more likely to be affected by the difference between dividends tax rate and 
capital gains tax rate. On the other hand, when state ownership is relatively lower, 
the impact of the difference between dividends tax rate and capital gains tax rate on 
the value of dividends is more likely to be lessened if short-term traders are 
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dominant around the ex-days. The results found in this study are consistent with the 
above. 
6.3. Research Implications 
 
6.3.1. To Board of Directors 
 
The empirical evidence from this study supports the relevance of dividend policy 
in the Vietnamese market. The study documents that dividend policy in the 
Vietnamese market affects firm value. Investors are found to value dividends and 
capital gains unequally at different levels of state ownership. Dividends are valued 
more than capital gains in companies with high a level of state ownership (the case 
when the State holds more than 50 percent of the total number of outstanding 
shares). However, dividends are less valuable in companies with medium state 
ownership (the case when the State holds between 20 percent and 50 percent of the 
total number of outstanding shares) and low state ownership (the case when the 
State holds less than 20 percent of the total number of outstanding shares). This 
finding provides the board of directors with some insights into the optimal dividend 
policy of companies with varying levels of state ownership. According to the results 
documented in this study, it would be most desirable for companies with high state 
ownership to set a high target payout ratio while companies with medium and low 
state ownership should keep a minimum payout ratio and retain funds for growth 
and expansion in order to maximise the value of the firm. 
6.3.2. To Regulators 
 
In Vietnam, short-term trading is believed to help boost capital velocity, increase 
trading volume and improve stock liquidity but create market instability 
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(VnEconomy, 2011). The responsiveness of short-term trading to tax changes 
suggests that taxes can be an influential tool for regulators to control short-term 
trading. It is found that when no tax on either dividends or capital gains moved to a 
five percent tax rate on dividends and a 20 percent tax rate on capital gains, the 
level of trading volume dropped significantly. This was followed by an increase in 
trading volume when dividends tax was removed and the 20 percent capital gains 
tax rate was reduced to 10 percent. 
6.3.3. To Investors 
 
The analysis of abnormal trading volume shows significantly positive abnormal 
returns before the ex-days. This implies that short-term traders in the Vietnamese 
market have not fully arbitraged away profit opportunities around the ex-days. 
Interestingly, the presence of positive abnormal returns was persistent only in 
stocks with medium and low state ownership, not in stocks with high state 
ownership. This suggests that there is still room for investors to realise excess 
returns by forgoing dividends and selling stocks with medium and low state 
ownership before the ex-days. 




Firstly, the thesis studies how taxes and state ownership affect the market value of 
dividends in the Vietnamese market by focusing on stocks listed on the Ho Chi 
Minh Stock Exchange (HOSE). HOSE is the largest stock trading centre in Vietnam 
with more than 300 listed companies. Companies to be listed on the HOSE are 
required to hold a minimum chartered capital of 80 billion VND. Beside the HOSE, 
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there exist other stock trading centres, namely Hanoi Stock Exchange (HNX) and 
UpCom where stocks of medium and small enterprises are traded.22 Among HOSE, 
HNX and UpCom, stocks on the HOSE are considered the most liquid. Companies 
listed on the HOSE are large-sized and characterised by extremely high earnings 
per share (Nguyen, 2013). Due to the difference in company size and liquidity of 
stocks in different stock trading centres in Vietnam, confining the sample to the 
HOSE-listed stocks presents a limitation of the study since stocks of smaller 
companies with less liquidity are not examined. 
Secondly, this thesis measures the market value of dividends by the ex-day drop-off 
ratio. In doing so, the study considered the event of cash dividends only and 
excluded other possible distribution methods such as stock dividends or share 
repurchases. 
Finally, the thesis investigates the impact of state ownership on the market value of 
dividends. Other types of ownership such as managerial or foreign ownership have 
been left unattended. 
6.4.2. Suggestions for Future Research 
 
Results from this thesis provide several directions for future research. First, a 
further study about the relation between state ownership and information 
asymmetry in the Vietnamese market is recommended. In this study, a higher 
market value of dividends is found at a higher level of state ownership. The possible 
explanation provided is based on the negative correlation between state ownership 
and information asymmetry which is documented by Choi, Sami and Zhou (2010) 
                                                          
22 The requirement on chartered capital of HNX and UpCom is 10 billion VND. 
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in China. A study of state ownership and information asymmetry in Vietnam is 
expected to provide a more insightful explanation to the finding of this thesis. 
Secondly, the study might be expanded to examine the effect of other ownership 
types such as managerial and foreign ownership on the market value of dividends 
to better understand how dividend policy affects the firm value under a different 
ownership structure of Vietnamese companies. 
Finally, the comparison of the market value of cash dividends and stock dividends 
would be worthy of future investigation. Such comparison would allow us to 
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Appendix A: Order Matching on the HOSE 
 
Stock price on the HOSE is determined by matching buy orders and sell orders 
using periodic order matching and continuous order matching. In matching order, 
buy orders at higher prices and sell orders at lower prices will take precedence. In 
case buy or sell orders are placed at the same price, these which entered into the 
trading system earlier will take precedence in execution. In placing orders, investors 
can choose limited order, market order, at-the-opening order or at-the-closing order. 
Limited order is the buying or selling order at a specific or better price level. Market 
order is the buying order at the lowest selling price level or the selling order at the 
highest buying price level. At-the-opening order is the buying or selling order at 
the opening price while at-the-closing order is the buying or selling order at the 
closing price. 
Periodic order matching is made on the basis of comparing buy orders and sell 
orders of stocks at a specific point of time. Periodic order matching is used to 
determine the opening price and the closing price of a stock for a given trading 
session. The executed price under periodic order matching will be the one that 
allows the highest trading quantity. Example 1.1 below illustrates how closing price 
of a stock can be determined using periodic order matching. 
Example 1.1. Suppose 8 investors A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H place buy/sell order of 






Buy order Sell order 
Price Quantity Price Quantity 
ATC 10,000 (A) ATC 5,000 (E) 
13.9 5,000 (B) 13.8 4,000 (F) 
13.8 8,000 (C) 13.9 9,000 (G) 
13.7 7,000 (D) 14.0 20,000 (H) 
 
 Given that buy orders at a higher price and sell orders at a lower price will take 
precedence, the table that follows presents the total quantity of stock X that can be 
executed at each price: 
Total buying 
quantity 





10,000 10,000 (A) 14.0 20,000 (H) 38,000 10,000 
15,000 5,000 (B) 13.9 9,000 (G) 18,000 15,000 
23,000 8,000 (C) 13.8 4,000 (F) 9,000 8,000 
30,000 7,000 (D) 13.7 5,000 (E) 5,000 5,000 
  
The closing price of stock X using the periodic order matching method will be 13.9 
since at that price the total executed quantity will be the largest at 15,000 units. 
Continuous order matching is the trading method that the trading system applies 
based on the compare-and-match basis for buying and selling orders once orders 
are entered into the trading system. Continuous order matching allows immediate 
price formation and transaction once the orders are entered into the system. In 
determining the stock price using continuous order matching, orders with the best 
prices are given priority. If two or more orders at the same price are placed, the first 
entered to the system will be executed first. If the ask prices are lower than the bid 
prices which mean orders can be matched, the executed price depends on which 
order is placed first. Example 1.2 below illustrates how the price of a stock can be 
determined using continuous order matching. 
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Example 1.2. Suppose 3 investors A, B, C place buy/sell order of stock Y with price 
and quantity as follows. Investor’s names are given in parentheses. 
Buy order Sell order 
Price Quantity Price Quantity 
20 500 (A) 17 1,000 (C) 
21 500 (B)   
 
- If order by C is placed first, followed by A and B, the executed price will be 17. 
- If order by A is placed first, followed by B and then C, the executed price will be 
20 and 21. 
- If order by A is placed first, followed by C and then A, the executed price will be 
20 and 17. 
- If order by B is ordered first, followed by C and then A, the executed price will be 
21 and 17. 
- If order by B is ordered first, followed by A and then C, the executed price will be 












Appendix B: Tests for Heteroskedasticity 
 
B.1.   DRi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t + β3 Dummy if period 1 +  
                                                                                             + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε 
 
B.2. ABRETi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +  
                                                               + β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε 
 
B.3. CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t + 
                         + β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε                 
 White’s test Breusch-Pagan test 
 Chisq Pr > Chisq Chisq Pr > Chisq 
Full sample 144.3 < 0.001 38.42 < 0.001 
High state ownership 55.37 0.063 15.77 0.0273 
Medium state ownership 5.09 1.000 1.61 0.9784 
Low state ownership 78.94 < 0.001 15.49 0.0302 
 
 White’s test Breusch-Pagan test 
 Chisq Pr > Chisq Chisq Pr > Chisq 
Full sample 84.83 < 0.001 34.69 < 0.001 
High state ownership 72.86 < 0.001 19.59 < 0.001 
Medium state ownership 157.2 < 0.001 11.59 0.041 
Low state ownership 68.65 < 0.001 29.00 < 0.001 
 White’s test Breusch-Pagan test 
 Chisq Pr > Chisq Chisq Pr > Chisq 
Full sample 107.4 < 0.001 62.31 < 0.001 
High state ownership 34.21 0.0079 6.94 0.2253 
Medium state ownership 144.3 < 0.001 38.42 < 0.001 
Low state ownership 47.28 < 0.001 39.81 < 0.001 
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Appendix C: Tests for Autocorrelation 
C.1.   DRi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t + β3 Dummy if period 1 +  
                                                                                             + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε 
 
C.2. ABRETi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +  
                                                               + β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε 
 
C.3. CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t + 
                         + β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε 
          
 





 Durbin-Watson test * Breusch-Godfrey test 
 DW Pr < DW Pr > DW LM Pr > LM 
Full sample 0.206 < 0.001 1.000 67.832 < 0.001 
High state ownership 0.985 < 0.001 1.000 118.207 < 0.001 
Medium state ownership 1.136 < 0.001 1.000 32.352 < 0.001 
Low state ownership 0.956 < 0.001 1.000 80.786 < 0.001 
 Durbin-Watson test Breusch-Godfrey test 
 DW Pr < DW Pr > DW LM Pr > LM 
Full sample 0.095 < 0.001 1.000 119.484 < 0.001 
High state ownership 0.893 < 0.001 1.000 134.084 < 0.001 
Medium state ownership 0.184 < 0.001 1.000 372.757 < 0.001 
Low state ownership 0.915 < 0.001 1.000 151.742 < 0.001 
 Durbin-Watson test Breusch-Godfrey test 
 DW Pr < DW Pr > DW LM Pr > LM 
Full sample 1.2878 < 0.001 1.000 39.022 <  0.001 
High state ownership 1.5649 < 0.001 0.999 8.777 0.0031 
Medium state ownership 1.607 0.0007 0.999 7.250 0.0071 
Low state ownership 0.9244 < 0.001 1.000 77.240 <0.001 
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Appendix D: Hausman Test for Random Effects 
 
D.1.   DRi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t + β3 Dummy if period 1 +  
                                                                                             + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε 
 
 
D.2.  ABRETi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 state ownershipi,t +  
                                                                 + β3 Dummy if period 1 + β4 Dummy if period 2 + ε 
 
 
D.3.  CAVi,t = α + β0 Sizei,t + β1 DYi,t + β2 Betai,t + β3 1/Pcum i,t + 
                           + β4 State Ownershipi,t + β5 Dummyif period 2 + β6 Dummy if period 3 + ε      
      
 
 m Pr > m 
Full sample 12.99 0.0235 
High state ownership 18.03 0.0029 
Medium state ownership 11.00 0.0514 
Low state ownership 43.71 < 0.001 
 m Pr > m 
Full sample 11.98 0.0351 
High state ownership 10.44 0.0636 
Medium state ownership 48.74 < 0.001 
Low state ownership 14.47 0.0129 
 m Pr > m 
Full sample 8.87 0.1809 
High state ownership 8.95 0.1766 
Medium state ownership 5.32 0.5040 
Low state ownership 19.62 0.0032 
